THE RECORDING OF POLICE STOPS: METHODS AND ISSUES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Every day, police officers in jurisdictions around the world conduct thousands of stops, identity checks, and searches. Police stops are notoriously imbalanced: officers experience them as routine, but people who are stopped find the experience can be embarrassing, intrusive, and frightening. And those who experience repeated encounters with the police may develop concerns about bias, overly-aggressive law enforcement, and the targeting of certain communities or groups. Despite the frequency and importance of these police-initiated contacts, police generally collect little data on their stops. Police legitimacy is inextricably linked to the manner in which officers use their powers and whether people perceive this manner as fair, reasonable, and transparent. Today, an increasing number of police departments are starting to record their use of stops, identity checks, and searches in order to monitor and track disproportionate impacts and to assess the stops' effectiveness.

Recording police stops and measuring their effectiveness is complex. Recording stop data generally requires the introduction of new data collection systems because many existing systems are not designed to generate statistical data or to support analysis and conversations with local communities.

Introducing the recording of stop data typically provokes resistance from police officers who feel that their professionalism is being questioned, and who worry about increasing bureaucratic burdens. But at the same time, recording only takes a matter of minutes; some bureaucracy is necessary to ensure that police are accountable, effective, and transparent; and establishing positive community relations, promoting accountability, and establishing legitimacy are part of 'real' police work.

This report sets out what data officers should record regarding police stops. It examines three techniques for recording police stops—paper forms, radio dispatch systems, and mobile systems—and notes the limitations of body-worn cameras (BWCs) as a means for capturing stop data. Finally, this report reviews experiences in implementing recording practices, including overcoming resistance, and offers recommendations for good practices. It is based on interviews with 35 people, over half of whom are current police officers, involved in the recording of stops across a range of countries. In summary, this report shows that properly recording police stops need not be burdensome, and can be used to improve police efficiency and police-community relations.

In general, stop forms collect the following information:

- Personal information on the person stopped (name, age, gender, address, identity card number where applicable).
- Vehicle registration.
- Ethnicity (and/or nationality).
- Name or badge number and unit/station of the officer conducting the stop.
- Time, date, and place of stop.
- Law or specific legal power used.
- Individualized grounds for suspicion (reason for the stop).
- Object (for searches: what are the officers looking for).
- Outcome of the stop (no action / search / warning / fine / arrest).
- Length of the stop.
- Extent of any search (e.g. is it a cursory pat down, more thorough search, or an intimate body search / “strip-search”).
- Use of force (e.g. handcuffing, restraint, pepper spray) during the encounter.
- Additional information on specific situations (e.g. stops of several persons or an incident, descriptions of clothing, other information that might be useful for intelligence purposes).

This basic data set enables analysis for multiple purposes, all of which can benefit the fairness and efficiency of policing, and some of which may provide additional inputs for intelligence, operational, and management purposes.

METHODS OF RECORDING

Paper forms

Historically, officers have recorded their stops on paper forms. This simple means of data collection is familiar to the police, who typically use paper forms for issuing fines and citations. Each officer carries a pad of stop-search forms, and completes one after conducting the stop. The form used in England and Wales consists of a front sheet and a yellow carbon copy given to the person stopped and/or searched. It generally takes officers 3-5 minutes to fill out the form. Officers submit their completed forms to their supervisors for review, after which the information is entered onto an electronic database, usually by police administrative staff or with electronic scanning equipment.

Strengths:

- ⊕ Easy to complete: officers are used to filling in forms
- ⊕ The person stopped receives a complete record of the stop at the time, providing immediate accountability
- ⊕ Affordable: stop forms can be introduced without significant financial investment in expensive equipment
- ⊕ Easy for supervisors to review

Weaknesses:

- ⊖ Officers and the public may view paper forms as old-fashioned
- ⊖ Requires double data entry, first to complete the form and then enter the information into the database
- ⊖ Poor handwriting can cause inaccuracies in data entry
- ⊖ No geo-coding for location to facilitate accurate mapping of stop activity

"With regards to paper records, it's cheaper straight off, you are not reliant on IT. Officers are used to pen and paper, filling out forms… the potential downside is that they won't be completed properly. They will miss boxes … because this is a brand new way of doing stuff, it's not just a small change…. It's bringing in a mental shift to start recording in a different way. As a starter, if you don't have mobile devices, paper will work well."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Dispatch radios

The use of police radios and computer-aided dispatch systems to record stops is fairly well-established in the United States, largely because it eliminates the need for officers to complete paper forms and builds on existing communications practices. When conducting a stop, the officer contacts the control centre by radio and verbally relays required data for the operator to record directly into the electronic database. The control room operator gives the officer a unique reference for the stop record, which the officer writes on a paper receipt and provides to the person stopped. The person can use that reference number to obtain the full record, either online or through a request to the local police station. It takes 2-4 minutes for officers to relay information, although there can be delays in getting through to the dispatch centre before recording can start. An electronic stop record is emailed to the supervisor for review.

Strengths:

- ⊕ Reduced bureaucracy (compared to paper forms)
- ⊕ Easy integration with existing police systems, which require officers to call in their stops to log activity and for safety reasons
- ⊕ Can integrate on-the-spot supervision
- ⊕ Control room checks encourage compliance

Weaknesses:

- ⊖ No full record for the person stopped
- ⊖ Inconsistencies in data-entry as information is relayed to and then entered by control room staff
- ⊖ Can overload dispatch systems, leading to delays and longer stops

"We did a survey with staff [about computer-aided stop records]. I think it was 94% of staff said they thought it was a significant improvement and they liked it. I mean, it's taken a 10-minute process down to two to three minutes. It involves very little work for them. It's easy, it's efficient, it takes other work away. So the user satisfaction of it is high.... Initially, [control room staff] were concerned about it in terms of demand. But if you're doing a person's check and you're using the information you've already got on your system, the large part of the work is already done for them. And we're not actually asking them to record that much extra work. So there is extra work in it for [officers], but the benefits outweigh the cost and demands."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Mobile devices

The proliferation of mobile device technology (MDT) has created new possibilities for the recording of police stop-searches. The use of MDTs in police vehicles is well-established in the United States, and officers on foot increasingly use mobile devices. The officer is issued a mobile phone or tablet with a stop recording application. The process of completing the online form generally takes 2-3 minutes. Once the form is completed and submitted, it automatically populates a centrally held database. The system provides the officer with a unique reference for the stop record, which the officer writes on a paper receipt for the person stopped. The officer's supervisor receives a notification to review submitted forms.

Strengths:

- ⊕ Officers view it as modern
- ⊕ Easy to use
- ⊕ Automatic data entry directly onto the database, no double entry
- ⊕ Automatic geo-coding to support mapping of stop activity
- ⊕ Built-in supervision options
- ⊕ Integration with other department software

Weaknesses:

- ⊖ No full record for person stopped
- ⊖ Potentially significant financial and start-up costs
- ⊖ Limits direct communication with person stopped

"Officers love the tablets and handhelds because it promotes professionalism and efficiency. They don't have to type things up when they get back into the station and it looks more professional. The technology is changing the way people working—officers are spending more time on the streets."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Body-worn cameras / video

Body-worn cameras (BWCs) are small video and audio recording devices designed to attach to a police officer's uniform. The use of body-worn video (BWV) to record police-initiated encounters is a relatively recent development that is rapidly becoming more popular. Department policies differ greatly on matters of when the cameras should be turned on and what types of incidents officers are required to capture. At the end of the shift, officers upload the video footage onto the force system, and may mark individual incidents for evidentiary or other value. While video footage provides a detailed, contemporaneous account of an incident, it does not generate quantitative data necessary to create statistics and analyse patterns of stop practice. BWC video cannot be assumed to be objective, as it suffers from perspective bias, has the potential for manipulation, and any interpretation of the footage is subjective. Cameras do not preclude the need to use other forms to produce statistics and to provide those stopped with a record.

Strengths:

- ⊕ Provides a contemporaneous account of contact
- ⊕ Assists in resolving complaints
- ⊕ May enhance civility in encounters
- ⊕ May support training

Weaknesses:

- ⊖ Does not record quantitative stop data
- ⊖ No record for person stopped
- ⊖ Risks of perspective bias
- ⊖ Cost, data storage requirements
- ⊖ Data editing for privacy required prior to release
- ⊖ Regulation is required to address BWV issues

"The stop form takes you two minutes to fill out; watching a video will probably take 30-40 minutes to go through to identify when on the footage the stops are. And at no point have you got the officer's grounds [for the stop]. Has the video captured what the person was saying? Is the camera 100 percent working? If there is a slight fault in it and the microphone is not operating, I cannot hear the name, the reasons, the grounds. BWV is supporting evidence. It supports, it does not replace stop recording. It has no idea what's going on in your mind.... The camera is there to record actions in the same way a paper form would but a paper form is more accurate and the camera definitely can't replace forms because, when can a camera smell cannabis?"

Police Officer, England and Wales

IMPLEMENTATION AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Recording police stops poses challenges beyond the technicalities of creating the right record. These challenges are rooted in both human and systemic factors. Foremost among the human challenges is officers' resistance to change. Resistance to recording stops is a recurring theme in this study, and interviewees emphasised the importance of police leadership, messaging, and the inclusion of officers of all levels in the design and implementation process as key factors in overcoming resistance. Systemic factors relate to the infrastructure required to create, store, and use stop records for their intended purpose, including questions about procurement, software development, the role of corporate interests, and important cost considerations.

Concerns about police bias are driving the trend towards recording stops, and research shows that the public, and particularly ethnic minority communities, value stop recording as a means of enhancing accountability. Stop recording, and particularly the recording of ethnic data, remains controversial in many settings, and it is essential that the introduction of these practices reflects community as well as police concerns and input into the development and design processes. Systems must be rooted in a solid understanding of specific community concerns if they are to respond to those concerns. For example, in jurisdictions where there are concerns about bias in stop practices, stop data collection systems that do not collect ethnic data risk further exacerbating mistrust. Yet the collection of personal data, particularly ethnic data, is complex and must be negotiated with local communities to respect the right to self-identification, meet national data protection standards, and build public confidence in the data collection process.

Simply making a record of police stops does little to address potential problems; the value depends on what departments do with the resulting information. Records can improve supervisors' understanding of how their individual officers are using stops, and can provide managers with valuable information for operational and strategic decisions about resource allocation and choice of tactics. The data—in the form of anonymized statistics—must also be shared with the public if it is to build trust in and the legitimacy of police. In practice, external accountability is often framed in corporate terms, whereby police simply put out general statistical information with little meaningful analysis or exchange about what that data means, or without any avenues to incorporate community feedback into police management and practices. Ideally, stop data should be used as the basis for a discussion of local policing practices and priorities. Several police agencies have developed innovative review panels that allow members of the public to use stop data to consider how officers are using stops and, in some cases, to assess individual records to review the quality of specific stops.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **All police departments should collect data on their use of identity checks, stops, and searches.** Data collection is essential in order to monitor and track disproportionate impacts and assess the effectiveness with which these powers are used. The collection of such data also provides a useful management tool for police leadership.

2. **Systems for the collection, analysis, and storage of stop data should be designed to include safeguards sufficient to comply with national and regional data protection standards.**

3. Systems for collecting stop data should be carefully analysed to ensure they respond to local context and concerns and make certain that any system weaknesses are understood and explicitly compensated for in the design and adoption process. **Considerations around accountability ('on-the-spot,' supervisory, or corporate), bureaucracy and compliance should be factored in from the beginning of the design process.** Procedural justice insights should inform design and adoption, with consideration given to transparency, voice, neutrality, consistency, and impartiality.

4. **The collection of statistical data on police stop-searches and ethnicity** is essential to determine whether, where, and why ethnic profiling is occurring and support measures to reduce it. Detecting and monitoring ethnic profiling require anonymized ethnic statistics that allow for comparison of minority and majority groups' experiences of policing.

5. **Ethnic data categories must be negotiated with local communities** to respect the right to self-identification and build public confidence in the data collection process.

6. **Stop data collection systems should include the following data categories at a minimum, to allow for meaningful analysis of ethnic disparities and to manage the fair and effective use of police powers:** personal information/vehicle registration, ethnicity (self-defined or officer-perceived), the grounds/reasons for the stop (in free text), the law used, the outcome of the stop, officer name or identification number, and time, date, and place of stop. Analysis can be enhanced by including further factors that might indicate any disparities in post-stop treatment such as length of the stop, extent of any follow-on search, and whether force was used during the encounter.

7. **A full record of the stop form should be made available—as easily and rapidly as possible—to the person stopped.**

8. **Transparency around the data collection process and all data collected is essential to support police legitimacy.** Anonymised statistics based on the stop data collected should be released in full to the public at regular intervals. The raw, anonymised, complete data sets should also be released to allow for independent and academic analysis that can increase public trust and confidence.

9. **Police departments should engage with the public around stop data to build dialogue, and shift practices to gain greater community support and reflect community priorities.**

1. INTRODUCTION

RECORDING AS 'REAL' POLICE WORK

The two most common forms of police contact with the public are calls for service (through emergency calls or other assistance lines) and when an officer decides to stop someone because he suspects that person may be breaking the law. For a police officer, conducting a stop is a routine matter and something she may do multiple times a day. But for the member of the public, being stopped by a police officer is generally an unusual and memorable event, regardless of how professionally the officer behaves. Police stops are typically conducted in public, often in plain sight of passers-by or neighbours; they can be embarrassing, even humiliating or frightening for the person who is stopped, especially if the stop proceeds to a pat-down (frisk) or search, both of which are highly intrusive and demeaning procedures for the person undergoing them. Despite the frequency of these encounters and increasing complaints about bias with respect to who is most frequently subject to police stops, there is little data on police stops collected globally.

Raising concerns about bias in police stops, a growing body of evidence in recent years has pointed to extensive bias in policing in countries across Europe. Additionally, research shows that biased or unfair profiling erodes trust in police and undermines police efficiency. Multiple studies have found that judgements about fairness and procedural justice shape people's assessments of police. In assessing what constitutes fairness, the literature points to the importance of consistency, impartiality, neutrality, and the ability of those affected by a decision to have a voice and be represented.[1] Research in the United States and the United Kingdom finds that public concerns about police stops are particularly focused on unfair targeting of people from black and minority ethnic groups.[2]

Police departments have begun to record their use of identity check or stop powers, and subsequent searches, in order to monitor and track disproportionate impacts and to assess the effectiveness with which officers use these powers. Stop data recording generally requires the introduction of new data collection systems because existing systems are rarely designed to generate statistical data or to support analysis. Where stops are recorded, it is often hard to search beyond individual record checks and link to any information on outcomes. Existing systems were designed around corporate interests, with little or no support for public accountability purposes. The resulting data is frequently only made public as total numbers of stops conducted by police per year, lacking the disaggregation to provide meaningful insights into patterns of policing.

Introducing stop data recording typically provokes resistance. Police, like many professionals, are averse to paperwork. Calls for police to be free from 'unnecessary' bureaucracy so they can get on with the 'real' job of fighting crime are rhetorically powerful and act as a barrier to the recording of police stops.[3] Such resistance has been challenged on the basis that recording only takes a matter of minutes; that some bureaucracy is necessary to ensure that police are accountable, effective, and transparent; and that establishing positive community relations, building trust and confidence, promoting accountability, and establishing legitimacy is 'real police work'.[4]

From a practical policing perspective, perceptions of fairness matter because they help to elicit consent from the public by generating a sense of legitimacy. If members of the public believe the police are legitimate and operate fairly, they are more likely to feel personally obliged to obey officers even if they disagree with the specifics of the order.[5] Fairness encourages the idea that citizens and the police are 'on the same side',[6] while unfair treatment communicates division, social denigration, and exclusion, fostering an 'us and them' dynamic that reduces trust and undermines legitimacy.[7] Securing cooperation and compliance through a strong sense of legitimacy is not only ethically desirable, but also more cost effective and ultimately more lasting than compliance secured through force.[8]

The common construction of bureaucracy as a burden locates the provision of accountability outside of core policing activities and may cast efforts to improve accountability as hostile attempts to limit officer discretion in ways that interfere with their ability to fulfil their 'real' mandate. Bureaucratic procedures aimed at ensuring high standards of officer conduct cannot be split from the 'real' work of fighting crime; one is a corollary of the other. Recording police stops can be used to promote some of what procedural justice demands, particularly if the subject of the stop receives a copy of the record, which alleviates some of the public's anxieties about such encounters.

Stone and Pettigrew note that providing a clear reason for the stop can ease anxieties about police stops.[9] Where no such reason was given, people felt uncomfortable and victimised; but where a reason was provided, and it was thought to be genuine, people felt happier and believed the police were just doing their job in stopping them. They also found that monitoring of the information collected on the record of a police stop had an impact. People felt there could be little accountability without regular monitoring of stop-searches and sharing of data with the general public. Recording was also seen as enhancing accountability by creating possibilities for making complaints.

A study carried out in the U.K. assessed the recommendation that stop and search recording should be extended to cover stops that do not lead to a search, including 'stop and account' (those stops in which officers only ask people to account for their presence or activity). This study confirmed that, for the general public, the main advantage of recording was in detailing the reason for the stop.[10] The study also showed that the form enabled people to prove they had been stopped, supporting potential complaints (other studies have found that complaints do not necessarily rise as a result of recording[11]), and, providing a receipt at the time of the stop could increase perceptions of openness and transparency.

ASSESSING ACCOUNTABILITY, BUREAUCRACY, AND COMPLIANCE

The recording of police stops raises a range of issues that can be summarised using the following ABeC framework:

- **Accountability:** Various forms of accountability can be realised by recording police stops. The person stopped may receive a copy of the form at the time of the stop ('on-the-spot' accountability) or later if requested. Supervising officers may use the record to assess the decisions made by officers under their command (supervisory accountability). Records may also be collated to produce statistics that can be used for internal and external monitoring purposes (corporate accountability).
- **Bureaucracy and efficiency:** Concerns about the bureaucracy involved in recording police stops have been a significant source of both resistance and innovation. Objections to unnecessary paper work have acted as a brake on recording practices, but have also been one of the main drivers for technological solutions.[12] Bureaucratic considerations are part of a broader set of concerns about efficiency, which include convenience to officers, speed, accuracy, data-coverage, financial cost, and procurement.
- **Compliance:** Police organisations often resist reforms and are reluctant to record stops.[13] While such resistance frequently focuses on concerns about unnecessary bureaucracy, it also draws on wider judgements about what constitutes 'real' police work. Objections to bureaucracy are often grounded in trepidations about how the data will be used. Police rarely object to bureaucracy that is geared towards enhancing their crime-fighting capacity, and the idea that recording is not 'real' police work reflects a preference for action-oriented policing.[14] Stop data collection systems can be designed to monitor and encourage officer compliance.

This report examines different methods of recording police stops, identity checks, and stop-searches practices, analysing the relative costs and benefits of three main techniques: (1) paper forms; (2) radio dispatch systems; and (3) mobile (technology) devices. The report also reviews the limitations of body-worn cameras as a device for recording police stops.

Each data recording method varies in terms of officer experience, data entry requirements and accuracy, supervisory value, geo-coding and mapping, public experience, and cost. Each method scores well in some respects, but weakly in others, and trade-offs may be required. Using the ABeC framework to assess different options makes it clear that there is no one perfect system for recording police stops. Different methods have different strengths and weaknesses and are suited to different applications. Much will depend on the precise reasons for recording, the broader policing context in which recording takes place, and the equipment and resources that are available. What might be efficient for the police organisation as a whole may not be efficient for front-line officers, and what might be convenient for front-line officers may not be suitable for those who are stopped. While some police agencies may be content with a single method of recording, others may decide that the best approach is to employ more than one method.

METHODOLOGY

This report assesses four different options for recording police stop-searches (paper forms, dispatch radios, mobile devices, and body-worn cameras/video) based on practical experience with their use across a range of jurisdictions. The analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with 35 people involved in the recording of police stops in seven different countries. The majority of the interviews were conducted in 2014-2015, with a second wave of interviews conducted in 2017-2018 to assess how the recording practices had developed over time. Approximately half of those interviewed were police officers with responsibility for strategic development and/or oversight of day-to-day recording practices in their agency. The remaining interviewees included police officers and government officials involved in policy development and oversight of police practice at a national level, as well as academics and other members of civil society. Quotes have not been attributed to individuals to maintain their confidentiality and anonymity. The bulk of the data-collection was conducted in England and Wales because stop-search recording is well-established there and the police are in the midst of adopting technological recording, providing an opportunity to study these recording tools and their implementation. Additional information was also gathered from police officers and other experts in Austria, Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States.

This report is the first part of a three-part series looking at different elements of stop data collection, analysis, and community engagement using stop data. The other papers are:

- **Toolkit for the Analysis of Police Identifications: A guide to the practical analysis of police stop data in PIPE sites and beyond** (2017). Using data from the Spanish *Programa para la Identificación Policial Eficaz* (PIPE), this toolkit explains how to analyse stop data, focusing on quantitative data analysis for pattern identification; provides questions to guide reflection and interpret the reasons for any troubling patterns identified; and offers considerations on how to develop and implement responses. The guide focuses on three key dimensions of police identification activity: frequency, disproportionality affecting minority ethnic groups, and effectiveness. It also explains four bases for comparison that may shed light on whether problems are persistent, which policing activities are generating disparities, and whether problems arise within the police organisation and/or in specific neighbourhoods. The toolkit was created in partnership with the *Plataforma por la Gestión Policial de la Diversidad* to support data analysis of stop data collected in Spain. It has been piloted at trainings with police and community representatives. It will be useful for any jurisdiction where stop data is collected.

- **Regulating Police Stop and Search: An Evaluation of the Reasonable Grounds Panel** (2019). The Reasonable Grounds Panel of the Northamptonshire Police is an innovative approach to regulating police use of stop and search powers. The panel engages the public directly in examining whether these powers are being used lawfully and in initiating corrective action in cases where officers fail to meet legal grounds for a stop. While designed in and for a specific jurisdiction, the Reasonable Grounds Panel has broader implications. Many current debates about what kind of policing is

consistent with democratic principles are framed in terms of values including trust, justice, and legitimacy. The panel operationalises these ideas and provides a practical template for regulating the use of police power, particularly where there are concerns about discretion and fairness.

OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT

This report first discusses the origins and development of recording in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere (section 2). Section 3 examines what data needs to be captured and why. Section 4 addresses the technicalities of how to record police stops through each of four methods, and closes with a chart comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each. This is followed by section 5, which discusses broader issues including police leadership, officer resistance, procurement, software design, and development.

2. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF RECORDING IN ENGLAND AND WALES, THE UNITED STATES, AND ELSEWHERE

Both U.K. and U.S. police departments began recording police stops because communities of colour alleged that police were practicing ethnic profiling. The development of stop recording in each country diverges in important ways, with the United Kingdom from the start adopting national statutory requirements, while civil rights litigation and occasionally federal intervention in some of the country's hugely diverse 18,000 state and local police departments has generally driven recording in the United States. The law in England and Wales has always included a focus on both accountability to the person stopped and corporate management, while in the United States recording has often been court-ordered, temporary, and characterised by limited public or managerial engagement. Recording practices developed in England and Wales and the United States have provided a template for the development of recording mechanisms in other jurisdictions in continental Europe, Australasia, and Latin America.

RECORDING PRACTICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Police in England and Wales are required to record 'stop and search' (often shortened to 'stop-search') under the *Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)*. This legislation was introduced in the wake of the 1981 Brixton riots and the subsequent inquiry led by Lord Scarman, which described the riots as 'essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people' at police tactics.[15] The Scarman Report highlighted the disproportionate impact of stop and search on black and minority ethnic groups and lack of community support for police tactics. While the report noted some problematic individual officer behaviour, it focused more on the role of 'consent'[16] arguing that in Brixton the police had lost the consent of the people to be policed through their use of 'unimaginative and inflexible' police tactics,[17] and a general failure to build relations with local communities. The report's recommendations focused on rebuilding consent through greater consultation and improved accountability.

The Scarman Report had a major influence on the development of PACE, which one expert called 'the single most significant landmark in the modern development of police powers'.[18] PACE created a new national stop and search power alongside safeguards governing its use, set out in a code of practice.[19] PACE Code A clearly defines stop and search as a mainly investigative power that enables officers to allay or confirm suspicions about individuals, particularly whether they are carrying stolen or prohibited articles, without exercising their power of arrest. The governing principles emphasise that stop and

search must be used fairly, responsibly, with respect, and without unlawful discrimination. Subsequent revisions incorporated new non-discrimination norms, notably the Equality Act 2010, which creates a positive obligation to 'have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination' and to 'advance equality of opportunity'.[20] Finally, Code A specifies that officers must have 'reasonable grounds for suspicion' to stop and search; specifying that this legal standard requires an '*objective* basis for that suspicion... so that a reasonable person would be entitled to reach the same conclusion based on the same facts and information and/or intelligence'.[21]

The requirement for 'reasonable grounds' was designed to guard against discrimination and to build the consent of the community. PACE Code A specifies that age, race, religion, or any other 'protected characteristic' cannot be used alone or in combination with any other factor as the reason for a stop and search. Code A insists that: 'All police officers must recognise that searches are more likely to be effective [and] legitimate and secure public confidence when their reasonable grounds for suspicion are based on a range of objective factors'.[22]

Standards are reinforced through a series of duties to inform and monitor the use of stop-search powers. Crucially, front-line officers must take 'reasonable steps' to inform the person searched of the officers' name and police station, the legal power that the officer is exercising, the purpose of the search, and the grounds for it. Officers also have a general duty to make a record of the search, which conveys much of this information, and provide it to the person searched.

The stop record must always include the self-defined ethnicity of the person subject to the search and, if different, their ethnicity as perceived by the officer carrying out the search; the date, time, and place of the search; the object of the search; the grounds for suspicion (except for exceptional powers that do not require reasonable grounds); and the identity of the searching officer. Until fairly recently, officers were also required to ask for the name, address, and date of birth of the person searched, though the person stopped had no obligation to provide this information, and many police departments continue to include these fields even though the requirement was removed in 2011. The record of the grounds 'must, briefly but informatively, explain the reason for suspecting the person concerned, by reference to information and/or intelligence about, or in some specific behaviour by, the person concerned' (para. 4.6). In practice, this requirement cannot be fulfilled through the use of tick boxes alone, but requires a free text entry.

As well as facilitating on-the-spot accountability to the person stopped and searched, PACE creates obligations for supervisory oversight and corporate accountability. Supervising and senior officers are required to monitor the use of stop-search, taking action where necessary to ensure compliance with the regulations. Supervisors must examine whether the records reveal any trends or patterns which give cause for concern and, if they do, take appropriate action. Senior officers with area or department-wide responsibilities are required to monitor the use of stop-search and, where necessary, take action at the relevant level. The code of practice requires the compilation of comprehensive statistical records of stop-searches at force, area, and local level, identifying and investigating any apparent disproportionate use of the powers, to support supervision and monitoring. Finally, the code requires transparency and community

consultation: 'In order to promote public confidence in the use of the powers, forces, in consultation with police and crime commissioners', are required to 'make arrangements for the records to be scrutinised by representatives of the community, and to explain the use of the powers at a local level'.[23]

The recording of stop-search in England and Wales has traditionally been on paper forms, but this approach has been largely displaced as part of a government-led push towards technological data-capture. In 2014, then-Home Secretary Theresa May announced that stop and search data would be added to the government's police portal, a website that shares data on crime rates and police activities at a local level.[24] This initiative was part of a broader reform package designed to address regulatory failings exposed following major public disorder in the summer of 2011. As in Brixton, the August 2011 riots again reflected anger over the misuse of stop-search, and the official inspection uncovered 'alarming' evidence of non-compliance with the law, with more than a quarter of inspected stop-search records failing to meet reasonable grounds, and 'disturbingly' low levels of supervision.[25] When announcing the reforms, May emphasised that people from black or minority ethnic backgrounds were up to seven times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than white people, and that only about ten per cent of stops of people of any race result in an arrest. Insisting that the misuse of stop and search is hugely damaging to the relationship between the police and the public, May said the police would implement mapping 'in order to improve transparency and accountability'.[26] As accurate mapping requires a specific geocode, this requirement has led police departments in England and Wales to adopt technological data-capture.

RECORDING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES

The U.S. experience of recording police stops is both similar to and different from that in England and Wales. Concerns about racial discrimination have been a key driver in both countries and Lord Scarman's recommendations drew heavily on the American response to major U.S. riots in the 1960s.[27] Vehicle stops and 'stop, question and frisk' (SQF) are common American police tactics and are associated with long-standing concerns about discrimination. Federal authority over policing is limited, with no national legislation requiring stop recording.[28] Standards for police work conducted by state and local departments are primarily set out in state statutes. State regulation must reflect the case law of the Supreme Court, which has created key national standards on police stops powers, but has not required recording of stops.[29]

The most referenced Supreme Court ruling governing the use of stop and frisk is *Terry v. Ohio* (1968)[30] in which the Court assessed the constitutionality of stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution (prohibiting unlawful search and seizure). The Court acknowledged that this tactic had been used in a racially discriminatory way, and held that police may conduct a stop (a temporary detention for investigation) and frisk (a cursory pat down of the outer clothing for the purposes of detecting weapons) on the basis of 'reasonable suspicion' rather than the higher 'probable cause' standard. In defining reasonable suspicion, the Court stated that an officer must be able to articulate the factual basis for suspicion.

PACE Code A recording requirement for searches that do not result in an arrest:

4.1 When an officer carries out a search in the exercise of any power to which this Code applies and the search does not result in the person searched or person in charge of the vehicle searched being arrested and taken to a police station, a record must be made of it, electronically or on paper, unless there are exceptional circumstances which make this wholly impracticable (e.g. in situations involving public disorder or when the recording officer's presence is urgently required elsewhere). If a record is to be made, the officer carrying out the search must make the record on the spot unless this is not practicable, in which case, the officer must make the record as soon as practicable after the search is completed.

4.2 If the record is made at the time, the person who has been searched or who is in charge of the vehicle that has been searched must be asked if they want a copy and if they do, they must be given immediately, either:

- a copy of the record; or
- a receipt which explains how they can obtain a copy of the full record or access to an electronic copy of the record.

4.2A An officer is not required to provide a copy of the full record or a receipt at the time if they are called to an incident of higher priority.

Home Office (2015) *Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Codes of Practice, Code* A, London: Home Office.

Both civil rights litigation and federal interventions based on the 1994 Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act have driven the development of recording practices in the United States. Early legal cases concerned vehicle stops, often on state highways (*State v. Pedro Soto, 1996*[31]*, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police*, 1993[32]). The *Wilkins* case yielded a court-ordered requirement that Maryland State Police should collect and release stop data.[33] This set a model for much subsequent litigation and court-ordered data collection, although often for limited time periods.

Concern over police stops of pedestrians emerged in New York City during the 1990s as the New York Police Department (NYPD) implemented the 'broken windows' law enforcement theory, which advises strict enforcement of laws against minor offences through extensive use of stop powers.[34] In 1999, spurred by the fatal police shooting of Amadou Diallo, the Office of the Attorney General investigated the use of stop and frisk amid deep public concerns about its impact upon minority communities. Officers in New York have been required to record stop and frisk activity since 1986. The NYPD's UF-250 form covers the name, age, gender, physical description, and race of the person stopped as well as the name, identification number, and command of the officer who performed the stop. This form was intended to be used for supervisory purposes and, according to training materials, 'to protect the officer and the Department from allegations of

BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF AGENCIES THAT COLLECT DATA, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OUTLINED THE BENEFITS OF A WELL-PLANNED TRAFFIC-STOP DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM:

Police forces committed to improving legitimacy find that measurement of police activity is a critical first step toward effective management.

Data collection sends a clear message that racial profiling is inconsistent with effective policing and equal protection.

Having available data moves the conversation within the community away from rhetoric and accusations to a discussion about the effective deployment of police resources.

In contrast to a rigid set of guidelines, the data collection approach allows a fluid and local determination of how to deploy law enforcement resources.

The process of collecting data begins to change behaviour of line officers and supervisors.

Ramirez, D., McDevitt, J., and Farrell, A. (2000) A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned, Washington: U/S. Department of Justice.

police misconduct'.[35] The Attorney General's report included the first comprehensive empirical analysis of NYPD stop and frisk practices finding that minorities, particularly black Americans, were stopped at a higher rate than whites, and differences in offending behaviour could not explain these disparities.[36]

In 1994, President Bill Clinton directed federal agencies to begin gathering data to address concerns about racial profiling in the context of traffic stops, and the 1994 Crime Act empowered the Civil Rights Bureau in the Department of Justice (DOJ) to intervene in state and local law enforcement when there is evidence of a pattern of practice that violates constitutional civil rights. DOJ published guidance on racial profiling data collection systems to encourage 'voluntary' compliance.[37] Hundreds of jurisdictions began to organise data-collection efforts and some states introduced legislation requiring police agencies to record and make public the racial and ethnic pattern of their traffic stops. Today about half the states mandate stop data collection, but some of these laws are temporary. Individual departments may also change their practices with turnover in police chiefs or elected authorities and city managers.

The focus on pedestrian stops and SQF has also expanded. For a long time the NYPD seemed to be the only U.S. police agency that regularly collected comprehensive data on pedestrian stops, but a recent survey found that more than 20 of the 55 largest police departments in the country were doing so.[38] While four of these departments were required to collect the data as a result of agreements with the DOJ Civil Rights Bureau or lawsuits brought by private citizens and non-governmental organisations, all of the others did so as a result of internal departmental policy. The vast majority of departments that record stop and frisk data include the ethnicity of the person stopped and frisked as well as the reasons for and location of the stop.

Although it is difficult to generalize about recording practice in the United States, there are some identifiable differences from the practice in England and Wales. Recording in the United States is driven by the goal of providing an empirical basis for assessing ethnic disparities and evidence of racial profiling. This focus leaves little room for using the records to promote on-the-spot or public accountability (in an exception, the NYPD was introducing a receipt for persons stopped at the time of finalizing this publication[39]). Harris notes that the recording of stop and frisk has the potential to increase transparency, but found only a minority of police departments made the data available to the public.[40] Police resistance to releasing data, and indeed to recording stops at all, reflects in part police concern that the data will fuel further litigation, which has indeed happened in some jurisdictions.

The information gathered in forms also varies, and has been limited by frequent use of pre-coded tick boxes rather than articulated grounds for conducting the stop.[41] The use of check boxes or drop-down boxes provides only 'the vaguest suggestion of the reason' for the stop, in the words of an expert interviewed. The tendency not to provide on-the-spot accountability is linked to the fairly widespread use of technological data-capture using laptops in cars (mobile data terminals/MDTs) and dispatch radio systems. As this report discusses in the next section, one of the disadvantages of such methods is that they do not generate a physical record that can easily be given to the person stopped.

THE STEPSS PROJECT

In January 2007, police forces and civil society worked together in pilot sites in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain through the 'Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search' project to monitor police use of ID checks and searches. The project first assessed existing policy and practice, then designed forms for recording stops, prepared and trained officers and community members on operational protocols, and collected stop data for six months. Throughout the process, police met with community consultation groups to share and discuss the stop data. Importantly, the project included ethnic data in the stop forms in every jurisdiction except one in Spain that used nationality data instead.

The data showed that police in every pilot site were ethnically profiling persons of ethnic minority and immigrant origin. Minorities and immigrants were more likely to be stopped, often more likely to be searched, but, almost without exception, were no more likely to be found to be offending than the majority group. In some cases, they were significantly less likely to be found offending than ethnic majority residents.

The act of data gathering also increased the effectiveness of officers' use of stops. In Hungary and Spain, officers in the STEPSS project tended to make fewer stops over the period during which they were required to record stops, but the proportion of their stops that produced an arrest or other law enforcement outcome increased. This suggests than officers are more effective when they focus on developing clear and individualised grounds for stops, and when their supervisors hold them to account.

In Fuenlabrada, one of the Spanish pilot sites, the police reduced the disproportionality in the rate at which they were stopping persons of immigrant origin. They achieved a dramatic decrease in stops of Moroccans from 9.6 times more often than Spaniards to 3.4 more often, largely because they ended a fruitless counter-terror operation. Overall, officers conducted just over half as many stops as they did before the pilot, while increasing the percentage of their stops that produced positive outcomes by nearly three times. Fuenlabrada achieved these remarkable results by making systemic use of the STEPSS data both for closer supervision of individual patrol officers and in force-wide management of operations and personnel deployment. The data enabled them to factor disproportionate ethnic impacts into their strategic decision-making and reduce unfair policing while enhancing efficiency.

STEPSS also resulted in the forging of new relationships between the police and community representatives through the stops monitoring process. In Fuenlabrada, these discussions directly helped the Municipal Police in identifying and addressing crime patterns and other community concerns. In Hungary, where the project used regular 'ride-alongs' to monitor the data gathering, the police and Roma community representatives developed new understandings and insights. One unanticipated outcome is that one of the Roma STEPSS community participants has now joined the police force – becoming the first Roma police officer in the county.

Open Society Justice Initiative (2009) *Addressing Ethnic Profiling by Police: A Report on the Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search Project*, New York: Open Society Institute.

Available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/profiling_20090511.pdf

More broadly, the relatively limited use of stop records to promote public accountability in the United States, compared with England and Wales, may reflect a difference in the way the two countries construct policing. The notion of consent is central to the way England and Wales understands policing and national regulations requiring on-the-spot accountability as well as more general forms of public accountability reflects this. Policing in the U.S. tends towards a more adversarial and militarized approach, shaped by a particular history of racialized social exclusion and state-level decision-making, in which public accountability is less central.[42]

RECORDING PRACTICES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Recording practices in England and Wales and the United States have provided a template for initiatives in other jurisdictions in Europe, Australasia, and Latin America. Longstanding concerns about ethnic profiling in police use of ID checks, stops, and searches[43] have led to initiatives by progressive police departments to measure their policing practices in order to be able to respond to these concerns. In 2007-8, the Justice Initiative coordinated a pilot programme, Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search (STEPSS), to introduce the recording of stops in police agencies in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Spain.[44] The British approach heavily influenced the STEPSS pilot: an introductory conference was held in London followed by study visits to two English police departments; the forms used for the pilot were based on those developed in England and Wales; and, in some sites, officers were required to give a copy of the record to the person stopped. In Spain, the *Programa para la Identificación Policial Eficaz* (PIPE), extended stop recording to two more Spanish police agencies.[45] It has since been extended to six other agencies.46 In November 2018, the Madrid Municipal Police introduced a stop form pilot. Similar data recording initiatives have been piloted in Victoria, Australia[47]; Wels, Austria; and São Paulo, Brazil; and new initiatives are currently underway in Amsterdam in the Netherlands; and Zurich, Switzerland. In a number of the European initiatives, ethnically-disaggregated data—which remains controversial across much of Europe—is not included in the forms, thus severely limiting their value as a tool to address disproportionality.

3. WHAT DATA NEEDS TO BE COLLECTED AND WHY

COLLECTING ETHNIC DATA

The collection of ethnically disaggregated data on law enforcement practices is essential for enabling statistical analysis to examine stop-search patterns across population groups and to respond to individual cases of discrimination. As Michael Rustin notes, race is 'both an empty category and one of the most destructive and powerful forms of social categorisation'.48 Yet race and/or ethnicity may serve as an important positive source of self and group affirmation.49 Given the prevalence of racial stereotypes linking minority groups to crime or violence, measuring race and ethnic status of those stopped is vital to determine that stops are being used equitably and lawfully and to measure the impact of procedures introduced to reduce discrimination and improve fairness. Forces that collect data on stops but do not collect ethnic data also risk exacerbating community frustrations as they will not be able to provide answers to concerns about ethnic profiling.

Collecting data on race and ethnicity is complex and requires consultation with local communities around the use of ethnic categories and developing systems to meet national data protection standards. The belief that data protection standards preclude the collection of information on ethnicity and policing is incorrect; in fact, the European Racial Equality Directive explicitly recognizes the use of statistical data in order to demonstrate unequal treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity (EU Directive 2000/43/EC, Preamble, Para. 15). European data protection law highlights the need to protect privacy and self-identification, while allowing for the good-faith collection and dissemination of ethnic data for legitimate purposes of public interest with safeguards in place.[50]

One safeguard is to omit the storage of personal data such as name and address in stop data. In the U.K. system, records include such information unless the person stopped exercised the right not to give it, which is rare. The NYPD records the person's name, address, and ID number on the paper form or on a mobile app but these details disappear when the record is transferred to the electronic database. This allows for aggregate statistical analysis on the dataset to look for patterns of discrimination but does not allow the NYPD to track repeat stops of individuals that may reflect targeting or harassment.

Which ethnic categories to use and how to collect them depends on the phenomenon being investigated. The purpose of data collection systems can differ; some may seek to explore whether broad population groups are being stopped more, less, or equally to white ethnic groups (i.e. is ethnic profiling taking place?), whereas others may be seeking more in-depth exploration of policing practices across different ethnic groups. None of the current stop-search data collection efforts record data on religion or perceived religion, although there are concerns about religious profiling in many contexts.[51] In some contexts, ethnic or nationality data has been used as a proxy for religion.[52] While providing some means of assessing whether different groups may be disproportionality stopped due to their religion, using ethnic proxies for religion will not illuminate the full extent of the experience of stop-search across different religious communities.

In general, stop forms collect the following information:

This basic data set enables analysis for multiple purposes, all of which can benefit the fairness and efficiency of policing, and some of which may provide additional inputs for intelligence, operational, and management purposes.

Examples: Officer perceived ethnic categories and self-identified ethnicity codes

New York Police Department Unified Form 250 ethnic categories:

- White
- Black
- White Hispanic
- Black Hispanic
- Asian/Pacific Islander

United Kingdom 18+1 self-defined ethnicity codes:

	Self-defined ethnicity (18+1)	Group	Code
1	English/Welsh/Scottish/ Northern Irish/British White	White	W
2	Irish White Irish		
3	Gypsy or Irish Traveller White Other		
4	Any Other White Background		
5	White and Black Caribbean Mixed	Mixed, Multi-ethnic Groups	M
6	White and Black African Mixed		
7	White and Asian Mixed		
8	Any Other Mixed / Multiple Ethnic Background		
9	Indian Asian/ Asian British	Asian, Asian British	A
10	Pakistani		
11	Bangladeshi		
12	Chinese		
13	Any Other Asian Background Other Asian		
14	African Black African	Black African, Caribbean, Black British	B
15	Caribbean		
16	Any Other Black / African / Caribbean Background		
17	Arab	Other Ethnic Group	O
18	Any Other Ethnic Group		
19	Not Stated	Not Stated	O

There are two common ways to collect ethnic data on stop practices: a police officer can ask for race/ethnicity details of the person stopped or officers can record their own perception of a person's ethnic appearance. In the United States, many data collection systems rely on the officer's perception, sometimes supported by personal information on state identification documents, if the state lists that information. They generally use broad identification categories.[53] The fact that many data collection initiatives are a response to concerns about ethnic or racial profiling drives the use of officers' perception. It is considered unimportant whether the officer had guessed correctly the race or ethnicity of the person stopped because the objective is to determine whether, having perceived the driver or pedestrian as a person of colour, the officer has stopped and treated the person fairly. Ethnic categories need to be broad enough to allow officers to make a judgement, but still be capable of identifying problematic policing practices. Using officer-perceived ethnicity can avoid concerns about officers' discomfort in asking someone for their ethnic identity, particularly during potentially tense stop encounters. It may also alleviate concerns that asking for personal data during a stop may exacerbate a person's sense of intrusion.[54]

However, relying on officers' perception raises concerns as to officers' ability to determine accurately someone's ethnicity and whether officers will record their actual perceptions. Some community groups have also expressed the importance of self-identification.[55] The U.K. data collection system uses both self-defined ethnicity and officer perception. This allow for cross referencing between the two types of ethnic categorisation and an in-depth data analysis of a broader range of ethnic categories. Officers ask individuals who are stop-searched to choose an ethnic category from a list of national census categories. The person is not required to give a response. The officer may also record their own perception of the person's ethnic appearance.

Some forces have used proxies for ethnicity. For example, the PIPE project works with a number of local forces in Spain to collect stop data to examine concerns around ethnic profiling.[56] Each data collection system is negotiated with local communities, and many have used nationality as a proxy for ethnicity. Although this can give some measure of ethnicity and illuminate differential treatment of migrants, many people police perceive as different may have been born in Spain or be naturalised citizens. The policy also potentially reifies notions of nation-states as mono-ethnic or homogeneous and could risk alienating communities who see themselves still defined as "others" or "foreign."

OTHER DATA

The collection of other **personal data** (name, age, address, identity card number, vehicle registration) supports analysis of patterns of stops by age, gender, and (ID) race/ethnicity, which can then be compared with the outcomes of stops, grounds for stops, and places and times in order to assess whether those stops were appropriate or whether there are patterns that might indicate discrimination. Personal identifiers such as name, address, identity card number, or vehicle registration allow for an analysis of repeat stop-searches on the same person possibly indicating targeting and harassment of that person.

Data on the individual **officer and unit/team** conducting stop-searches enables analysis that can support direct supervision of individuals' as well as units' use of their powers, and may assist in identifying officers whose practices are clearly out of the norm (outliers) because they are more (or less) effective or more (or less) biased. This can allow managers to identify issues with tasking or resource allocation to particular units. Information at both individual and unit level can be cross-referenced with additional data such as crime rates and calls for service in the relevant unit or patrol area. It may be best to analyse trends over time within an area as this controls for area-specific differences.

The **time and location** that stop-searches take place are required to examine patterns, which again can be compared to reported crime rates to support more efficient police resource deployment. Accurate location data allows forces to use mapping software to map where and when stop-searches are taking place. This can then be overlaid with local crime map data to ensure effective use of resources. Analysing the outcomes for stops by time and place may also indicate whether other tactics might be more effective.

Detailed information **on the specific reasons for suspicion** is essential in order to determine whether stops meet legal standards. Articulating clear and lawful grounds will support any subsequent outcome flowing from the stop. Requiring officers to articulate specific grounds has been shown to make officers more attentive and to reduce risks of arbitrary stops. Research shows that the more reasonable and objective the officer's decision to conduct the stop, the less likely it is to be disproportionate.[57] Reasonable and objective decision-making also increases the effectiveness or 'hit rate' of stops. Officers should be required to provide a detailed reason for the stop in their own words, whether in written or oral form, rather than using a code, multiple choice, or menu of options. In efforts to reduce bureaucracy and increase the reliability of data for analysis, some police departments have experimented with using generic categories to provide the reason for the stop. Generic categories provide no meaningful information about the decision-making behind the stop to allow for an assessment of reasonableness. As one officer described, "*we tried doing drop down menus. But in the age of data analysis, [you] need more information about what [officers are] really stopping [people] for. [The] problem with drop down menus [is] that you can make everything fit. Even with unjustified stops, you just check a box and it looks justified*" (Police officer, United States, Interview S). Research backs up this insight that providing a credible reason is an important lever for promoting police legitimacy.[58]

Recording the **object or item** that officers are searching for provides an important reminder for officers of the purpose of the search and can be compared with items found.

Recording the **outcome** of a stop-search is essential information to determine how effectively the police are using their powers and resources. The outcomes listed will depend on the national options for disposals coming out of stop-searches but may include: an arrest, a summons, a citation/ticket, a verbal warning, or no further action. This makes it possible to calculate the effectiveness of stops through the *hit rate* (the rate at which stop-searches lead to positive outcomes) or *arrest rate* (the rate at which stop-searches lead to arrest). Hit or arrest rates can be simply calculated by dividing the

CASE STUDY: HUNGARIAN STOP DATA COLLECTION FOR STEPSS

In 2007, the Hungarian police participated in the Strategies for Effective Stop and Search (STEPSS) project, which aimed to identify discriminatory use of ID checks. During a six-month pilot, three police departments collected data on their officers' use of ID checks. The project team devised a very simple stop form and process to minimize paperwork and comply with Hungary's strict personal data protection laws.

The 1992 Hungarian Data Protection Act requires government agencies to treat data related to ethnic affiliation or origin as sensitive data which can only be lawfully processed in connection with other personal data if an act of Parliament permits or by the consent of the people it concerns. Since it was deemed impractical for the police to ask for consent during the stop, and no act of Parliament had occurred, police officers were not authorized by law to process data of ethnic origin during the course of conducting ID checks. Therefore officers recorded the perceived ethnicity of people they stopped on a separate and anonymous STEPSS form. These forms were stored separately from the standard ID check forms that the police have a legal obligation to complete and recorded separately, then destroyed. This meant there was no possibility of restoring a link between the race / ethnic data and the individual with regard to whom the data have been recorded. The data therefore ceased to be personal, and the Data Protection Commissioner and the Minority Rights Commissioner approved the procedure.

Kádár, A., Körner, J., Moldova, Z. and Tóth, B. (2008) *Control(led) Group: Final Report on the Strategies for Effective Police Stop and Search (STEPSS) Project* (Budapest: Hungarian Helsinki Committee).

number of people arrested or stopped with a positive outcome by the overall number of people stopped. They can be compared across policing areas and ethnic and other demographic groups. It is also important to measure whether the outcome of the stop-search was linked to the initial reason for conducting the search. This increases transparency by allowing for a distinction between those outcomes that are a result of a professional judgement (i.e. the officer found what they were searching for), and those where the item found was not what the officer was searching for, or where nothing was found or an outcome like arrest was generated as a result of a conflictual encounter. Recording the outcome is the most accurate test of the reasonableness of the grounds for using stop and search powers.

A **copy of the record** has several benefits, namely: helping people better understand what happened during the stop-search (particularly knowing the reason for the stop), informing them of their rights, and providing the name of the police officer involved in the stop-search should people want to complain.[59]

POST-STOP POLICE CONDUCT

Discrimination can occur at various points during a police-initiated contact. These include: a) the decision to stop; b) the decision to search and the extent of that search; c) the decision on what law enforcement action to take (e.g. arrest, citation/fine); and d) the conduct of the stop (e.g. length, language used, use of force etc.). Thus, to provide data for management and assessments of fairness and effectiveness, monitoring should consider the recording and analysis of the reasonableness of decision-making at each stage. This can be done by recording the *length of the stop*, which allows managers to determine if the time a person was detained for is appropriate given the specific context and to compare detention times across ethnic groups. Recording the **use of force** such as the use of handcuffs or other physical restraint during a stop-search allows for oversight of use of force and comparisons between different officers and units and across ethnic

MONITORING THE QUALITY OF ENCOUNTERS BY THE HERTFORDSHIRE CONSTABULARY

In 2007, the Hertfordshire Constabulary introduced stop forms that include a section to record the quality of the encounter. At the end of a stop-search, officers were required to ask the person stopped:

> **Thinking about the experience of being stopped by your local police on this occasion, which of the following do you agree with:**
>
> • **I understand the reason I was stopped. Yes/No**
>
> • **During the stop, I was treated professionally, respectfully and with dignity. Yes/No**

The forms have a line just under these questions for the stopped person to sign to acknowledge their answers. The inclusion of these questions creates a focus on more professional conduct among officers. The questions (including the use of the phrase "your local police") are also intended to empower the public and reinforce the notion of policing as a public service. They also provide supervisors with means to monitor officers' completion rates and professional conduct.

Analysis of answers to these professional conduct questions showed that people were generally most satisfied with stops that result from planned operations, probably because these are based on intelligence and officers are briefed beforehand, enabling them to provide full explanations of why they are conducting stops. Stops conducted in response to an incident—such as a witness reporting "suspicious behaviour," for example—had the lowest satisfaction ratings. This may be due to the limited and rapidly changing information available to officers, leading to a poorer explanation of the reasons for the stop.

Monitoring of the data showed that black people and young people were least likely to be asked about their treatment and most likely to record negative experiences when asked. Officers who disproportionately stop ethnic minorities were also least likely to complete the stop forms.

and other demographic groups. Most jurisdictions require different levels of suspicion for searches of different levels of intrusion. Measuring whether a search has taken place, for what reasons, the level of intrusion (e.g. what clothing was removed and by whom) and authorisation given allows an analysis of whether legal standards have been met.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

Often stop forms contain space for officers to record **additional information on specific situations** (e.g. stops of several persons or an incident, descriptions of clothing, or other information that might be useful for intelligence purposes). Cameras, of course, if used during stops, inevitably provide information beyond what a form would provide. Depending on what national law allows, some police departments use stop and search records to establish who was present at a particular time and location when an incident occurs, enabling officers to identify potential witnesses and offenders, while also ruling-out other potential suspects. One English police department explicitly viewed the recording of stops as a form of intelligence gathering and developed a new system to link stop and search and intelligence databases. As one officer employed there explained:

> *"The old paper records were really good for intel.... I have actually solved robberies off the back of the intelligence that we had on the old paper records because they were written in such a way that allowed us to capture clothing details and other factors. So if I was looking for two people, one in a red coat, one in a blue coat, of a certain age, certain ethnicity, in a certain area at a certain time. Put those details into the search database and it brought up people stopped around the place and time. Then we could get CCVT [closed circuit television] to confirm—that's them."*
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

The intelligence value of data, of course, depends on the police departments' ability to ensure the accuracy of the data recorded and the timeliness with which it is entered onto the database to allow for analysis.

Some interviewees tended to downplay the intelligence value of stop-search records, arguing that this was not their primary purpose. While emphasising the regulatory purpose of recording, these interviewees noted that their departments encourage officers to submit an intelligence report in addition to a stop record if they felt that a stop-search had produced information that might prove to be useful:

"We'd never consciously used, and don't now use, stop and search as an intelligence gathering tool. I mean, if you look at the purpose of stop and search, it's not to gather intelligence. Okay, it's, I think, an acceptable by-product of the process, but the principle aim is not for the police to gather data and intelligence on individuals. So we have what we think is a decent system for submitting, recording, accessing intelligence. So what we're saying to cops, if you do a stop and search and you think there's something more needs to be recorded than what's on the form, submit an independent report, and that'll get assessed as an intelligence report, rather than a stop and search form."

Police Officer, England and Wales

The evidentiary value of body-worn camera video is a matter of debate and has become a focal point for competing anxieties about police stops. The private sector in the United States advertises BWV as providing extensive evidentiary value.[60] Others find these assertions both alarming and less than entirely persuasive. There was broad agreement among the academic experts consulted for this report that video footage does not constitute objective evidence. Even those who were generally supportive of cameras agreed:

"Body-worn-cameras only give you one point of view and there's an issue of perspective bias. One camera facing in one direction gives you one portrayal and this affects how people perceive things. If you record investigations and you have one camera focused on the suspect this may give a different impression than having one camera on the suspect and one on the interviewer. That can't help but be true in the field as well. You will only get one perspective. It's so much better than no recording but you can't ignore the fact that it's one perspective and has its biases."

Academic, United States

BENCHMARKING AND ANALYSING STOP DATA

Collecting stop-search data is of little use without a meaningful analysis of that data and a commitment to openly sharing and discussing the data collected.[61] In order to analyse the data and determine whether stops are used in a fair, proportionate, and effective manner, the data must be compared to a benchmark that supports the development of appropriate comparisons.

There is often confusion as to what constitutes ethnic disproportionality and how it is measured. One method of assessing ethnic disparities in stops is to calculate the *disproportionality ratio*. This compares the rate of stop-search among black and minority

ethnic groups with that among whites. Such comparisons are based on rates of stop and search per 1,000 people in a group: the number of stop searches per 1,000 black people who live in an area is compared with the number of stop searches per 1,000 white people who live in the same area. Using this approach, the 2018-2019 data for England and Wales shows that black people were stop searched at a rate of 9.7 times and Asian people at a rate or 2.7 times higher than those who identify as white.[62]

Another method for analysing ethnic disproportionality in stop data is calculating an *odds ratio*. The odds-ratio quantifies the probability that police will stop members of a particular ethnic group as compared to other ethnic groups. Thus, the statistic can best be understood by filling in the ratio in the following sentence, "If you are Black (or Arab), you are x times more likely to be stopped by the police than if you were white." For example, a study of stops on the Paris Metro showed that a person of Arab origin was 13.24 times more likely to be stopped than a white person in the Gare du Nord in Paris in 2008, while a person of black origin was 6.7 times more likely to be stopped than a white person in the same station.[63]

The most commonly used benchmark, particularly for pedestrian stops, is census or resident population data, where that includes ethnic data, as it does in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere, Comparing stop data to the census data provides an overview of different ethnic groups' overall experience of police stops and searches[64] Census data is a broad comparator that has intuitive appeal by virtue of being easy to understand. It can be used for benchmark data at the national, regional, or city level and is relatively low cost. Census data allows reasonable estimates of different ethnic groups' overall experience of stop-search,[65] However, the residential population may not accurately reflect the population that is available on the street to be stop-searched because it does not take account of the transient population, changes in population numbers that have taken place since the most recent survey, or differences in the time that people spend in public places.[66] In response to these limitations, several more statistically rigorous approaches have been developed to measure the 'available population', meaning the group who police could stop.

In one such approach, researchers develop a picture through direct observation of who is present in a location at specific times and thus eligible to be stopped by police, creating benchmark data. Police stop data for the same areas and time periods is analysed against these calculations. In the United Kingdom, several studies have found that the ethnic composition of the available population differs markedly from that of the residential population and that these differences go some way in accounting for the apparent disproportionate use of stop and search against people from minority communities.[67]

Intense debates around methodologies to measure available populations have arisen in the United Kingdom. Academic commentators have argued that being available does not, in itself, constitute sufficient grounds for a stop-search and is not a neutral criterion. The nature of the available population is partly a function of police organisational decisions about where and when to conduct stop-search.[68] To the extent that stop-search is concentrated in neighbourhoods with large minority ethnic populations, members of

these groups are bound to be more 'available'. As availability will inevitably also be tied to structural inequalities, including unemployment, housing provision, and exclusion from school, focusing on the available population may simply serve to legitimate the uneven and potentially unjust use of police powers.[69] Another issue is that observational methodologies only provide a snapshot analysis of a specific time, and stops take place over time. But creating repeat observational benchmarks to examine trends over time could be prohibitively costly.

Benchmarking becomes an even more complex proposition for traffic or vehicle stops. Given that driving populations are inherently transient, particularly on motorways or major roads, and that not every one of legal age can drive or owns a vehicle, it cannot be assumed that local census data represents those using the roads. As with the available population methodological approach, benchmarks have been developed through traffic surveys which use direct observation to create a benchmark, including the ethnicity of drivers and, in some cases, offending behaviour such as speeding, disaggregated by ethnicity. Stop data for the same road(s) can then be compared to the driver and offending profile in the traffic survey benchmark.[70] Traffic surveys have not provoked the same controversies as available population surveys of pedestrians, and have been accepted by U.S. courts as a fair and accurate measure of disparities in police stop practices. However, as with all surveys, traffic surveys are a time-specific snapshot, a significant limitation.

Other, cheaper, approaches rely on internal comparisons of stop data to identify variance indicative of ethnic profiling. Examples include hit rate analysis[71] and 'veil of darkness' analysis (which is based on the understanding that officers have difficulty identifying the race/ethnicity of drivers at night).[72] Every method has limitations, and in the United States there has been extensive debate about the value of different approaches. One response to the challenges of benchmarking has been to apply multiple methods, such as those used by the U.S. state of Connecticut (see box).[73] Other jurisdictions have focused on analysis of post-stop decision making, such as the decision to search, length and conduct of the stop, use of force, and the outcome decision and how decisions correlate with the race/ethnicity of the person stopped. Such analysis can identify bias in decision-making and negates the need for benchmark data.[74]

There are good reasons to seek narrower and more precise benchmarks, not least to be fair to officers, but also to gain deeper insight into specific dynamics that can then inform policy and operational responses. However, for residents who experience or perceive policing as biased and unfair, the effort to narrow the benchmarks can appear to be an effort to explain away bias with statistics. More complex benchmarks can be harder to explain and more costly to develop, which could present a misuse of resources better spent on engaging communities' experience of unwanted police contact and finding ways to police without a heavy reliance on proactive stops and searches.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS

Under state law, all 93 municipal departments and the state police are required to gather data on their stops and searches of vehicles. The Institute for Regional and Municipal Policy at Central Connecticut State University analyses the data and issues regular reports. The analysis evaluates the vehicle stop data for racial and ethnic disparities using (1) intuitive measures that compare the data against uniformly applied benchmarks and (2) sophisticated econometric techniques that compare the data against itself without relying on benchmarks.

The intuitive and descriptive tests identify police departments with consistent disparities across each test in excess of a defined threshold through comparing stop data to three different benchmarks:

1. The statewide average comparison compares the percentage of black, Hispanic, and minority (BHM) drivers stopped by each police department to the statewide average of each category of drivers stopped, and against BHM population percentage. This identifies those departments which are outliers with larger numbers of stops of BHM persons relative to the percentage BHM resident population in that policing area.
2. The estimated driving population comparison is applied to the municipal police (not state police, who only patrol highways and small towns). Stop data from peak commuting driving hours is compared to the estimated driving population to develop ratios to compare BHM and white drivers' likelihood of being stopped.
3. The resident-only stops are compared to the local resident driving age population from the state census.

The sophisticated econometric techniques are:

1. The Veil of Darkness test examines a restricted sample of stops to assess the relative differences in the ratio of minority to non-minority stops that occur in daylight as compared to darkness. The assumption informing this test is that police officers can more easily discern the race and ethnicity of drivers during daylight hours, and differences in stops conducted at night versus daytime will reveal profiling. The analysis is based on stop records taken during specific hours in order to control for other factors such as varied road use and is considered rigorous and broadly applicable.
2. Synthetic control analysis creates a unique benchmark for each individual department using various stop-specific and town-level demographic characteristics, including ethnicity, age, gender, and employment characteristics, and traffic stop data, including type of stop, department and officer stop volume, time of day, and day of week and month, to analyze disparities in stops of racial and ethnic minorities.

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CONTINUED

STATE OF CONNECTICUT TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS

3. Hit rate analysis focuses on post-stop outcomes using an internal comparison of stop data. The test assumes that police make decisions about which vehicles to search for drugs or contraband based on the likelihood of detection, while motorists take into account their likelihood of being stopped and searched when deciding whether to carry drugs or contraband. Unbiased policing should equalise hit rates across observable categories of drivers, and variance indicates bias.

Analysis can take a 'deeper data dive' and examine specific types of stops – speeding, distracted driving, moving violations (running stop sign, etc.) and stops considered more discretionary, such as defective lights, excessive window tint or display of license plate violation – and the post-stop outcome disaggregated by race in order to identify specific drivers of disproportionality that may inform policy and practice changes.

Ross, M., Fazzalaro, J., Barone, K. and Kalinowski, J. (2017) *State of Connecticut: Traffic stop data analysis and findings, 2015-16*, Connecticut: Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy. Available at: www.ctrp3.org

4. METHODS OF RECORDING

This section examines methods of recording stops and searches, including traditional pen and paper methods, dispatch and radio-based methods, and technological data capture including those based on mobile devices and body-worn cameras. Drawing on the ABeC framework presented earlier, the analysis considers both the advantages and disadvantages associated with each option, looking at the officer experience, data entry and accuracy, supervisory value, geo-coding and mapping, the public experience, and the cost of each method.

PAPER FORMS

Historically, officers recorded their stops on paper forms. This simple means of data collection is familiar to the police, who typically use paper forms for issuing fines and citations.

The Fuenlabrada police in Spain have highlighted the value of paper-based recording. This small municipal department located in the Madrid metropolitan area was one of three Spanish police agencies that participated in the STEPSS pilot. Fuenlabrada police introduced paper-based recording of stops as part of a broader set of reforms aimed at improving the use of stops. A recent evaluation of STEPPS found that, while the reforms were broadly successful across the sites, some of the most pronounced effects were evident in Fuenlabrada.[75] Ongoing commitment to the reform principles for more than five years after the pilot saw continued reductions in stop rates, the maintenance of lower rates of disproportionality, and continued improvements in hit rates. Variations in the implementation of the pilot across the sites were linked to differences in agencies' commitment to reforms, staff resistance, and levels of external support. Fuenlabrada was the only agency that substantially implemented procedures to manage

Strengths:

- ⊕ Easy to complete: officers are used to filling in forms
- ⊕ The person stopped receives a complete record of the stop at the time, providing immediate accountability
- ⊕ Affordable: stop forms can be introduced without significant financial investment in expensive equipment
- ⊕ Easy for supervisors to review

Weaknesses:

- ⊖ Officers and the public may view paper forms as old-fashioned
- ⊖ Requires double data entry, first to complete the form and then enter the information into the database
- ⊖ Poor handwriting can cause inaccuracies in data entry
- ⊖ No geo-coding for location to facilitate accurate mapping of stop activity

DATA-DRIVEN STOP MANAGEMENT IN FUENLABRADA

In Fuenlabrada, collecting stop data strengthened police supervision and management. Officers initially had problems completing the open field used to describe the reason for a stop, so guidelines were developed that required them to choose from a fixed list of operational categories (accompanying guidance listed examples of the grounds that would be acceptable in each case). In addition to listing a category, they would fill out an open text field to offer more detail on the reasons.

The sergeant in charge of STEPSS analysed the data monthly. Paying attention to the reasons officers gave for stops was helpful to senior officers in supervising frontline officers. For example, they were concerned with officers who had chosen "other" or "attitude or suspicious behaviour" categories as their explanation for stops because this allowed discretion for officers to act on stereotypes or negative generalizations. Therefore, supervisors first ensured that officers understood the different categories and the type of stops that fell into each, which resulted in a reduction in officers recording "other" on the forms. The free field for recording "motivation" then allowed senior officers to monitor the reasons given for stops under the "attitude and suspicious behaviour" category to ensure they met the appropriate thresholds.

Senior officers also used stop data to guide personnel deployment. Although most crimes and anti-social behaviour take place on the weekend, analysis showed that the greatest number of stops were being made on Wednesdays. This was because officers tended to manage their schedules to work more on weekdays rather than weekends. Similarly, when managers plotted stops by time of day for October, they found times of day when few or no stops were conducted at all—apparently because officers were all taking their breaks at the same times. Managers restructured break times to make sure that officers were available at all times.

In the years following the STEPSS pilot, the agency has continued to use data in these kinds of ways. In the subsequent period, rates of disproportionality remained lower than they had been at the beginning of the pilot, stop rates continued to decline, and the hit rate for stops—which had already improved during the pilot—continued to improve.

Open Society Justice Initiative (2015) *Fair and Effective Police Stops: Lessons in Reform from Five Spanish Police Agencies*, New York: Open Society Foundations

stops based on data analysis, which may help to explain why it was also the only site that showed consistent improvements in hit rates (see text box).

Paper recording was well suited to the emphasis that the Fuenlabrada pilot put on improving relationships between police and citizens: the forms provided information about citizens' rights, including how to make a complaint, and were numbered so that the issuing officer could be automatically identified. While there has been some experimentation with electronic pens and ongoing interest in technological approaches, the decision to use paper-based methods was pragmatic, reflecting the fiscal realities facing a small police agency in a time of economic crisis.

Data collection process

In police departments using paper forms, each police officer carries a pad of stop-search forms, and the officer completes one after conducting the search. The form typically consists of a front sheet and a yellow carbon copy. The person searched receives the carbon copy of the form at the time of the search or may be able to request it from the local police station for a period after the stop.

It generally takes 3-5 minutes to complete the form. Supervisors review completed forms and sign the back of them if they meet legal standards. The information on the form is then entered onto an electronic database, usually by police staff. Some police departments use electronic scanning equipment, which scans the data on the form and puts it into electronic form. Police staff then check it for accuracy.

Officer experience

Interviewees widely disparaged paper-based approaches, variously describing them as 'the most basic process', 'a twentieth century process', 'outmoded', 'deemed not fit for purpose' and 'the past'. Objections revolved around two principal themes: that it is inconvenient for front-line officers and inefficient for the police organisation. For example:

> *"One of the things police officers traditionally don't like doing is something bureaucratic and writing anything down.... If you imagine the scenario, it's the middle of February, it's pouring with rain and you're trying to write that out on a streaming piece of paper, getting the detail that was required. It's not user friendly."*
>
> **Police Officer,** England and Wales

As well as the practical difficulties, interviewees identified a general reluctance among officers to engage in paper work, which reflected implicit judgements about what constitutes 'real' police work: 'Police officers, they don't join to fill forms in, do they? They join because they want to go and engage with people, so it's probably not our strongest point'. This antipathy to form-filling was reflected in widespread claims that paper-based methods increase resistance to recording among front-line officers who consider them to be unnecessarily bureaucratic:

> *"It's an uphill battle with the rank and file—senior officers are reluctant to go down the pen and paper route because it's asking officers to fill in another form."*
>
> **Police Officer,** United States

"It is possible to record the data using pen and paper, but you'll get far less argument from officers if you collect it electronically. Many officers complain about collecting data and we've worked very hard to ensure empirically that it doesn't take long to record the data—one minute or less. I'd definitely recommend going electronic because my experience is that you get far fewer complaints from officers." (Academic, United States)

Data entry and accuracy

The inefficiencies associated with paper-based approaches were primarily related to 'back office' functions such as data-entry. Interviewees felt it was inefficient to have to transfer hand-written information from paper forms onto electronic databases. If officers were required to enter the information onto the database themselves they saw this as encroaching on their other work:

"The problem with the paper-based system is the dual recording aspect, you're recording it at the scene and then recording it subsequently.... You're costing an officer maybe five minutes out on the street, and then at the end of the day, they've got to then go in and input that for another five minutes, you know, and it's just a double cost for every single encounter."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Identified inefficiencies relating to data-entry included concerns about data accuracy and the time-lag involved in getting information onto an electronic database. Others felt that the need for 'dual recording' inevitably increased the potential for errors and pointed to long delays in supervision and data-entry, which, they felt, severely limited the value of the data once it was entered onto the system:

"[Paper-based systems] bring all the sort of data quality issues you'd expect with pieces of paper that are passed around a massive organisation like ours. And what we were finding is that from the actual process of recording an incident on the street to going through submission into a supervisor to check it—if indeed it was checked—onwards into an administration department and then being inputted onto a computer-based system, so I could at least look at the data, could take six to eight weeks. Which is of absolutely no use to us when we want to look at that data realistically on the same day, so we know who we've stopped and searched and look at the accountability around that... So those forms were deemed not fit for purpose as they could be lying around for weeks waiting to be signed off [by the supervising officer], for example, and the data quality was inherently poor and inaccurate."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Supervisory value

One advantage of the paper form is that officers can hand the full physical record over at the end of the shift to the supervisor for review. This was not always the case with the electronic systems, some of which required sergeants to log in to check whether their officers had done any stop-searches that needed their review. Paper-based systems require the supervisor to sign the forms prior to passing them on for data entry into the database. There is no clear audit trail for records that do not meet the required standards and supervisors' actions in response are not recorded.

Geo-coding and mapping

Paper forms allow officers to capture a general location such as a street, park, or building, but not the specific geo-coded location that is necessary to use mapping technologies. Technological data-capture automatically geo-codes locations in the stop-search record. In the United Kingdom, the decision to move away from paper-based methods reflected the need to provide accurate location data:

SAMPLE COMPLIANCE PROTOCOL FOR PAPER FORM RECORDING

Connecticut has 106 law enforcement agencies of which 7 use paper forms. In 2015 and 2016, the number of stops those departments reported declined significantly, and Central Connecticut State University analysts conducted an audit.

Paper-based data collection is challenging to audit. The audit consisted of reviewing information recorded in police dispatch logs to see if the information matched that reported in the traffic stop data system. It also requested copies of all paper forms to determine the accuracy of the data being reported. The audit was unable to determine the exact number of unreported stops, but estimated that each department failed to record over 1,000 stops.

Based on these results, analysts recommended the standard operating procedures of the New London Police Department as a model system to replicate in order to ensure that the majority of traffic stops are properly recorded. These procedures state:

- At the end of each shift a supervisor must sign every traffic stop form, and verify that a form has been completed for each stopped called-in to dispatch.
- The form should include a space to record a computer-aided dispatch number, which enables cross-matching against the dispatch log when conducting a review.

Source: Ross, M., Fazzalaro, J., Barone, K. and Kalinowski, J. (2017) State *of Connecticut: Traffic stop data analysis and findings, 2015-16*, Connecticut: Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy, p. XXIV. Available at: www.ctrp3.org

"The problem with the ability to map is, if they use a paper-based system, the officers will describe a location as high street somewhere, which could be half a mile long. So the ability to map it in a succinct manner and a meaningful manner is really quite challenging if they don't have an automated system."

Police Officer, England and Wales

"You're never going to be able to do it with a form because the officer knows the name of the road and the town that they're in; they're highly unlikely to give you postcode."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Public experience

A key advantage of paper-based recording over other technologically driven forms of data-capture is the ability to provide on-the-spot accountability. Paper recording produces a carbon copy of the record that officers can easily give to the subject of the search, allowing the provision of complete information. Individuals are able to see the reason for the stop-search and compare it with their perception of the situation, and with what officers told them, and decide whether they feel the record is accurate. Technological forms of data-capture make on-the-spot accountability more difficult because they do not produce a physical record that can be handed over to the subject of the stop-search.

Cost

Affordability is a key advantage of paper-based recording systems . Paper-based recording can be introduced without significant financial investment in expensive equipment such as mobile phones or laptops and the cost of developing software. Paper forms will, however, have some costs, including design and printing of the forms and data-entry.

DISPATCH RADIOS

The use of police radios and computer-aided dispatch systems to record stops is fairly well-established in the United States, largely because it eliminates the need for officers to complete paper forms and builds on existing communications practices.[76] Officers already call in their stops to dispatch rooms either to log activity and location for officer safety, or to request an identify check on the person stopped. The movement away from paper recording in England and Wales has provoked considerable interest in the use of radios. The Home Office is currently replacing the existing digital radio infrastructure, Airwaves, with a 4G Emergency Services Network (ESN). This is creating interest in how the new system might be used to capture stop and search data efficiently.

Warwickshire and West Mercia police illustrated the value of a radio-based data collection system, developing a joint system based on a voiceover Airwave solution. Officers use their radios to relay verbally all the information about a search to a member of staff in the control room, who records the information on an electronic database. The main advantage was the perceived reduction in bureaucracy for officers completing paper forms and the efficiency with which the recording process fitted within the police check system. A member of the department reported that officers welcomed the change:

> *"We did a survey with staff. I think it was 94% of staff said they thought it was a significant improvement and they liked it. I mean it's taken a 10-minute process down to 2 to 3 minutes. It involves very little work for them. It's easy, it's efficient, it takes other work away. So the user satisfaction of it is high.... Initially, [control room staff] were concerned about it in terms of demand. But if you're doing a person's check and you're using the information you've already got on your system, the large part of the work is already done for them. And we're not actually asking them to record that much extra work. So there is extra work in it for [control room staff], but the benefits outweigh the cost and demands."*
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

Data collection process

In police departments using radio-based systems to collect stop data, each police officer contacts the dispatch or control centre to provide information about the search. In the United Kingdom, the process has developed over time. Early systems made a distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' data. Objective data includes things like the ethnicity of the person being searched, the power being used, the object that is being searched for, and the outcome of the search. Officers enter objective information directly into the department database by pressing buttons on the radio to select appropriate options from drop down lists shown on the display. The grounds for the search are defined as subjective data and the officer relays them over the radio to an operator who enters it

Strengths:

- ⊕ Reduced bureaucracy (compared to paper forms)
- ⊕ Easy integration with existing police systems, which require officers to call in their stops to log activity and for safety reasons
- ⊕ Can integrate on-the-spot supervision
- ⊕ Control room checks encourage compliance

Weaknesses:

- ⊖ No full record for the person stopped
- ⊖ Inconsistencies in data-entry as information is relayed to and then entered by control room staff
- ⊖ Can overload dispatch systems, leading to delays and longer stops

onto an electronic database. In other systems, the officer provides both objective and subject information orally to the operator. Where the person being searched is already known to the police, their information automatically populates the record. There are different systems for officers to call into the dispatch centre—most departments use their police radios to reach the control centre as they would for any other non-emergency call, while others use their radios in telephonic mode and some suggest that officers call in on mobile phones. The operator records all the information directly onto the electronic database and then provides the officer with a unique reference for the stop record, which the officer writes on a paper receipt for the person searched. The person can then use the reference number to get the full record online or upon request from the local police station, where it is kept for a specified amount of time.

It is estimated that it takes 2-4 minutes for officers to relay the information to the operator, although there can be delays in getting through on the radio to the dispatch centre before recording can start. In some systems, the transcript the operator recorded is emailed to the officer to check and then submitted for supervision. In others, the operator enters it directly into the electronic database and the supervisor receives a notification to review. In some departments, as officers' supervisors and colleagues can hear the information officers supply on the call to the dispatch centre, which is live on the airwaves, and could determine if they were meeting legal standards, interviewees felt the radio dispatch recording offered simultaneous supervision.

Officer experience

Officers preferred the Airwave system to the paper-based system it replaced, considering it more efficient, accurate, and effective. Interviewees estimated that the amount of staff time a stop-search takes had fallen from 12 minutes to 4 minutes. An internal review found extremely high rates of data accuracy and noted that supervision had improved 'absolutely, no question', and that the 'failure rate'—indicating non-compliance with the legal requirement—had fallen from four per cent to 'virtually zero'.

User satisfaction with the new system was also reportedly high. An internal staff survey indicated that 94 per cent of staff thought that the new system was a significant improvement on previous practice. However, some interviewees noted that if the control room was busy, the system could delay an officer in the process of a stop:

> *"[It] required us to phone somebody. As a result, it was time consuming. Although we can make an estimate and we have staff to answer the phones, we do not know how much traffic is going to come through. So an officer is calling through and the person who answers it is the same person who would be taking 101 [non-emergency] calls. As well as calls from the public, it would be lots of stop and searches and PNC [Police National Computer] checks coming over the phone, you could be [stuck] on the phone waiting 20 minutes for it to answer, so it is a huge time restraint on the actual recording."*
>
> **Police Officer**, United Kingdom

Initial concerns focused on the additional workload for the control room, but it was noted that the new arrangement did not create much extra work as control room staff could quickly input information when officers would call in to conduct a person check.

Data entry and accuracy

In practice, the Airwaves system, which required officers to type into their radio codes to record the stop-search, posed several problems. Officers did not always record objective data at the time of the search and, as one interviewee stated, 'quite a lot' of recording was happening back at the station. This made it difficult to match up the records and provide a full copy to the subject of the search, particularly as identifying information—such as names, date of birth, and address—is not recorded.

Systems that involved officers relaying information directly to the operator tended to be perceived as more efficient and accurate. Control room staff enter the grounds for the search using text entry. If a person was already known to the police, entering his or her key information would populate other fields automatically, and drop-down menus had the most frequently used options on top. Officers perceived this approach as fitting naturally into the process of conducting a stop-search as the officer routinely checks the identity of the person being searched via the control room.

Supervisory value

The records the control room created provide the basis for internal monitoring and supervision. Officers can access the database to check their own records and supervising officers can check officers' searches. In most radio-based recording systems, once the

original stop-search record has been completed, the officer who conducted the search receives an automatic follow-up email. The email asks for further information about the stop-search—whether any outcomes were linked to the original grounds for suspicion, whether any items of clothing were removed, and whether a strip search was conducted—and if the officer agrees with the grounds that have been recorded. Officers can provide further information about the grounds at this stage, but cannot alter the original record. If the officer who conducted the search does not complete the record at this stage, he or she receives daily reminders until it is complete. At that time, the supervising officer receives an email informing him or her that there is a stop-search record ready to be authorised. If the supervisor is dissatisfied with the information recorded on the stop-search record, he or she can mark it a failure or send it back to the officer for clarification. If supervisors fail a stop-search record, they are required to record what action they have taken to address the issues identified. As well as establishing a clear audit trail, this system gives supervisors a visible reminder of what they need to do. As one officer pointed out, paper forms are a visual indicator that it is necessary to do a task as a form moves from one person's tray to another. He noted that the system is 'not an efficient way of working', but that replacing it with an electronic system requires a replacement for that visible indicator, which the email provides. The system also allows chief inspectors in local districts to log onto the stop-search database and do a secondary audit. This involves dip sampling a number of stop-searches each month to look at the quality of the grounds and the supervision and comparing results across the department.

Geo-coding and mapping

The location of the stop-search is automatically geo-coded by the Airwave radio, which generates eastings and northings coordinates and transfers them into the stop-search record.

Public experience

Officers are expected to fill out a receipt or business card, which includes their identification number and the time and date of the stop. When the record has been completed, a reference number is relayed to the officer who writes it onto the receipt, which is then given to the subject of the search. The receipt constitutes evidence that a search has taken place, but does not provide a full copy of the stop-search record, which may be obtained at a local police station or online at a later date.

Cost

Radio-based recording systems were generally viewed as more affordable than introducing mobile data collection. Officers already have radios and the process can be designed to fit into existing systems. Costs of building out the system include developing software for data recording and the time and training for control room operators who enter the data. Airwave itself was a source of concern to some interviewees. They felt that data usage was 'expensive'.

AN EXPERIMENT WITH AUDIO RECORDING REASONABLE GROUNDS

In an early iteration of Airwave radio recording, officers were encouraged to relay the grounds for the stop and basic information about the search in front of the person being searched as a way to promote transparency. These voice transmissions were recorded as radio traffic and connected to the data file but were not transcribed. Officers would then provide a receipt or business card, which included a unique reference number for the stop-search as well as the date, time, and location of the search. The person would then later be able to access the search record and the audio record of the grounds using that unique reference number.

The distinctive feature of this department's approach is the emphasis on real time supervision, which was introduced to minimise bureaucracy: peers and supervisors are expected to monitor the grounds as they are relayed to the communicator and can intervene through private conversation over the phone (so as not to undermine the officer in front of the person being searched). Several interviewees also spoke positively about the verbatim recording of grounds, suggesting that it encouraged better articulation of the reasons for the stop-search and improved on-the-spot accountability:

> ***"[Officers] are required to verbally articulate in front of the subject the reason why, the object that they're looking for, and the reason why they're stopping, which I think is really powerful. Because when we did our public survey [before the department adopted the Airwave], most of the people who were stopped and searched weren't really aware about why it had taken place.... [I]f you are articulating the grounds in front of the person, ... they're hearing what you're saying, so it's partly there, whereas with a MDT [Mobile data terminal] you probably wouldn't be doing that, so it's probably beneficial to do that."***
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

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AN EXPERIMENT WITH AUDIO RECORDING REASONABLE GROUNDS

"I quite like the fact that you can record the grounds over the radio. It's actually what you're saying. Because the temptation in recording grounds is to write just a very small number of words, and in the U.K. that's definitely down to the space that's left on the form for you. These little pockets pads give you space for about six words, which isn't really evidentially that strong if you're talking about searching someone and potentially using a power. So being able to describe what you're thinking and what you're doing on the radio and having other whole conversation captured is obviously more robust evidence."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Interviewees did raise some concerns about this form of recording grounds. Interviewees suggested officers may be reluctant to relay grounds in front of the subject of the search or their colleagues, arguing that they might feel awkward. They also expressed doubts that audio records of the grounds could be made available to the subject of the search and that conducting supervision over the radio is practical. On officers suggested that 'real-time' supervision falls short of the requirements laid down by PACE:

"I think it's a very generous interpretation that we're achieving the aims of PACE by listening to a radio conversation... People are in and out of radio conversations; people turn their radio off at certain periods of the day because they have to do things that are controversial or that are private. I don't accept that [interpretation] at all, and I wouldn't accept that.... I just don't think that's an ethical way of supervising stop search.... I expect someone to sit down with whatever [the record of] that search is, either on screen or a piece of paper, look at it, consider it, quality assure it and make a decision, is it ethical or not? You can't do that listening to a radio in my opinion."

Police Officer, England and Wales

MOBILE DEVICES

The proliferation of mobile technology has created new possibilities for the recording of police stop-searches. While the use of mobile data terminals (MDTs) in police vehicles for this purpose is reasonably well-established in the United States,[77] (reflecting the U.S. focus on vehicle stops and widespread adoption of mobile data terminal or laptop technology) it remains an emerging feature of policing elsewhere Many of the police agencies involved in this study were using some sort of mobile technology or were in the process of adopting it. For many agencies, the adoption of technological solutions is part of a broader shift towards paperless ways of working. Arrangements for recording police stop-searches were often being developed in the midst of considerable change and several agencies were overhauling or reviewing their existing information technology (IT) infrastructure. As a result, some of the processes that were being put in place were stopgaps rather than ideal solutions.

The experience of the West Midlands Police in the United Kingdom highlights the value of a stop-search app used by officers on their mobile phones. The department used paper-based recording, then a radio-call in system, then moved to a stop-search app. Under the upgrade, all officers received mobile telephones equipped with an app supporting direct recording of stop-searches on the mobile phones. The department had previously experienced difficulties with a radio-based data collection system, including extending the recording time for stop-searches and inaccuracies on records. Officers reacted positively to the mobile stop-search app and the department has seen an increase in the numbers of stop-searches recorded, which they credit to improved speed and accuracy of recording on the app. An officer we spoke to stated that officers had a better "overall impression" of the process of recording stops when they started using the app because

> ***"They like the fact that they have the control over what they are recording. We saw an increase in the numbers of stop and searches being recorded on the system. Our [recorded] searches have jumped by 20-30 per cent. I think that officers have more time to be proactive. If before, they were conducting two searches a day, and it took an hour on the phone to record them. Of course, they are going to think, I don't really want to search them, now they have that hour back they can go and do things, search people and can record it quickly with their fingertips. Officers aren't held up by the bureaucracy of the radio call."***
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

Strengths:

- Officers view it as modern
- Easy to use
- Automatic data entry directly onto the database, no double entry
- Automatic geo-coding to support mapping of stop activity
- Built-in supervision options
- Integration with other department software

Weaknesses:

- No full record for person stopped
- Potentially significant financial and start-up costs
- Limits direct communication with person stopped

Data collection process

Each police officer receives a mobile phone, laptop, or tablet, which contains a programme or app for recording the details of each stop-search. The process of completing the online form takes 2-3 minutes. Once the form is completed and submitted, it automatically populates a centrally held database. The systems for supervision differ depending on the design of the programme: some send a notification email to the officer's supervisor to prompt review; others expect supervisors to check the database regularly to see if their officers have completed stop-search records that need review. The supervisor checks the forms and makes a note either authorising the stop-search or noting problems with the details recorded and the actions the supervisor will take.

Officer experience

The perceived advantages of using mobile technology were primarily related to efficiency and the additional functionality that the technology provides. Officers reportedly welcomed the new technology as easy to use and not requiring any new training:

"We basically just pushed it out to all our people: 'it's there, go and use it!' It's easy to use. Everybody has a mobile phone.... Although the operating systems are a little bit different, generally speaking, I know I press a home button, I know how to use a keypad, I use my finger as a mouse. It is exactly the same over all phones. People are so used to using smart phones. For some apps, they require training, but this search app is so straightforward, you'll be asked the same questions that you were answering on paper forms or over the phone the last few years in the same order. It's very intuitive."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Interviewees attributed the ease of the transition in part to an increasing familiarity with this way of working as mobile devices were being used for other functions, including taking witness statements and making crime reports. The stop-search application was similar to these other applications and was designed to be 'as intuitive and easy to use' as possible so as to minimise the training costs. A PowerPoint presentation and a training video were made available to officers in the pilot sites, but most had learned how to use the application informally from other colleagues.

One police department claimed that an internal audit showed that officers who had mobile devices were spending an extra hour a day on the streets and out in the community:

> ***"Officers love the tablets and handhelds because it promotes professionalism and efficiency. They don't have to type things up when they get back into the station and it looks more professional. The technology is changing the way people working—officers are spending more time on the streets."***
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

As well as potentially speeding up the encounter for the person being stopped, it was suggested that the greater efficiency and convenience afforded by mobile devices mitigates officer resistance:

> ***"Once police come up to speed on the technology they find it helpful in reducing the tedious paperwork. For such a long time, one of the biggest concerns has been the paperwork and if you give police more paperwork they won't fill it out. I was told by a police chief that officers don't want to do stuff that is not fun, [stuff other than] the kicking in doors and catching bad guys. So this is a step forward getting them to do paperwork on technological devices."***
>
> **Academic**, United States

The additional functionality of mobile devices brings a range of other benefits and was likened to having 'your office is in your hand'. A police officer said, '[w]e will record exactly the same information [as we did before] but it's done immediately. There is no need to wait for somebody to answer the phone'.[78] Based on this success, departments were exploring how they might use mobile devices to provide front-line officers with real-time information, including crime maps, and to undertake real-time supervision through video-chat applications.

Data entry and accuracy

The main perceived benefit of using mobile devices to record police stops is that it eliminates the need for 'dual recording': when an officer enters data onto a mobile device it can be used to automatically populate a centrally held database. Interviewees noted that the 'whole point' of mobile devices is that officers 'don't have to then go back and waste time, sitting in a police station typing out forms' and that 'the big advantage for the organisation is cost, because you don't need to have a middle person recording the details'. The electronic form on the app has been designed to make the process of data entry as efficient as possible, with drop down menus for applicable areas and reminders for officers to complete all boxes before they can submit the form. Interviewees also felt that having the officers enter the data themselves improved the accuracy of the record and eliminated errors:

"Another issue that we potentially had, a regular complaint from officers: 'I told the controller that these are the reasons I did the search and the controller typed something else.' This came up regularly. I know from personal experience, there have been times when I have told the controller something over the radio and they have typed something else up. It's that lost in translation, trying to get through the record quickly. So the accuracy of the records wasn't always 100 percent. Changing a word very slightly in most cases isn't going to have that much effect but sometimes it could. So the emphasis is now on the officer entering the information."

Police Officer, United Kingdom

Supervisory value

Supervision needs to be built into the system design; otherwise, mobile devices may limit officer accountability. Most police departments had built in a supervision process that requires supervisors to authorise the stop-search record and indicate if they are dissatisfied with any aspect on the record and what action they have taken, as interviewees described:

"We also obviously give guidance through our policy that it's not just ticking a box, there's got to be active supervision, you've got to look at training if it's required, discipline if necessary, and it's not just also checking that, it's also dip sampling the officer's records, if it's your officer. It is also getting out on the street and supervising some of the encounters as well. So that's the guidance, it's not just tick a box, there's a lot more."

Police Officer, England and Wales

"As a supervisor, I will be checking the system for unsigned records. I will go down it and I will be looking to check that everything has been filled in, whether outcomes are completed and make sense. E.g., if it was an arrest for stolen property then you expect to find things found, otherwise why would you be arresting them? Sergeants are given two options:

a) Meets standard

b) Doesn't meet standard and what are you going to do about it? For example 'spoke to the officer about a mistake on the form, officer understands and action plan is to double check all is stop and search paperwork.'"

Police Officer, England and Wales

One officer explained that his department has

"Two layers of supervision. No one wants to explain themselves to the gaffers [bosses], so will ensure that they get it right. Could have three or four sergeants dealing with somebody but the inspector will have the overview and may have the same person fed in from different Sergeants. Most people only muck it up the once!"

Police Officer, England and Wales

Geo-coding and mapping

GPS-enabled mobile devices can generate geocodes that are automatically entered into the record, establishing the precise location of a police stop-search. Where this was not possible due to a lack of available technology or limitations with the data-management system, it was envisaged that officers would read their location from an app on the mobile device and enter the co-ordinates into the database manually. It was perceived as a key strength of the technological data collection, potentially making the stop-search data more amenable to area analysis and comparison with crime and tasking maps.

Public experience

Mobile devices have several potential disadvantages. A notable difficulty is in providing a full copy of the record to the person who has been stopped. The most common system is to provide a paper receipt on which the officer writes a reference number that can be used to get the full record online or upon request from the local police station, where it is kept for a specified amount of time. This does not provide a full record at the time of the

stop, but the receipt can be used to obtain a full copy of the record after the encounter. There has been some experimentation with the use of mobile printers to produce a physical copy of the record at the time of the search to provide to the stopped person. While this seemed viable for U.S. officers patrolling in vehicles, U.K. officers felt the technology would be impractical, unreliable, and expensive. Some interviewees felt it was unreasonable to burden officers with carrying another piece of equipment while out doing foot patrol.

The use of receipts has generally been accepted but one officer in a national oversight role argued it would not be consistent with the spirit of the U.K. PACE legislation. He said that it was up for 'debate' whether it was 'compliant with the rules' due to privacy concerns and a process of getting the full form that seemed onerous:

"The problem is you've got a receipt number, but are forces checking that it is the individual who was stopped who they're handing over the information to later? Will people bother, because the process is quite difficult to access that information… my view is if they're entitled to a form there and then, they should be given a form there and then. Which pushes the debate back into 'can you lose the paper-based system?' But the rules are the rules, and under the current legislation they're entitled to a copy. They should only be directed to go to a police station and request one if it's operationally… not practicable to give it them at the time. The fact that they've changed the system to me isn't an operational reason for not doing so…. There's no reason why the officer can't either physically write out a small descriptive note of that rather than a great big form, just making sure that they have sufficient detail. I don't think a receipt with a number goes far enough to comply with the rule."

Police Officer, England and Wales

In both the United States and the United Kingdom, officers also suggested that mobile devices might act as a barrier to effective communication with the public:

"[Technological recording] has the downside of removing the understanding that policing needs to be about interpersonal skills. … [You have] all these young guys that like to play on the technology but you can't text 'put your hand up'. You need to have interpersonal skills that are often lacking from young officers."

Academic, United States

"[With mobile devices] you've got the issue about not looking at and not engaging with the person that you're speaking to… street skills. So you've got somebody in the back of your car. To identify who they are, you'll ask them questions like their name, date of birth, address. You'll ask them about people who live next door to them, which we check on the voters' register. You ask them what their star sign is and check if their birthday's correct, whether they're lying to you. These are all the kind of questions that will funnel down…. They can add to the value of stop and search. Again, I don't think doing stop and search on those devices is what we should be doing, I think we should be speaking to the member of the public, so we [meaning his department] didn't go for those [programs]."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Although most police departments were 'device agnostic' in the sense that they did not favour a particular brand or type of device, interviewees raised concerns about the use of laptop computers in police cars. A U.S. police chief described a mobile computer as 'a tether' that ties officers to the car and preferred handheld devices for this reason. English officers suggested that laptops encourage officers to record stop-searches after the event, which would undermine on-the-spot accountability:

"We had what we call mobile data terminals…and it was possible to record a stop and search on that, but it was clunky and awkward because, you know, how do you record a search from inside a vehicle when you're searching a person outside the vehicle? And again it almost encouraged people to record after the event rather than during the event."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Costs

A key disadvantage of using mobile devices to collect data is affordability. Technology-based recording requires significant financial investment in expensive equipment such as mobile phones or laptops, which will require replacing when lost or broken, and upgrading at regular intervals. There is also the cost of purchasing or developing software. Some interviewees mentioned additional costs such as having to pay for any 'fixes' or additions to systems or to ensure compatibility between different pieces of software departments might use.

BODY-WORN CAMERAS/VIDEO

The use of body-worn cameras (BWC; also known as body-worn video, BWV) to record police-initiated encounters is a relatively recent development that has gathered rapid momentum. British police first piloted BWV in the mid-2000s, primarily as a means of gathering evidence,[79] but the use of cameras has proliferated in both the United Kingdom and the United States in response to officer-involved shootings, and BWV has come to be viewed as a tool to address concerns about police conduct and means to improve police-community relations.[80] Use of BWV is spreading to the EU. There are now over 60 types of cameras designed for police use.[81]

The U.S. National Institute of Justice, in a primer on BWV notes that implementers and citizens alike hope that it will 'help capture a record of police-involved incidents and provide increased transparency and legitimacy'. Other perceived benefits it lists are 'improved behavior for both police officers and citizens; expedited resolution of complaints and lawsuits; improved evidence for arrest and prosecution; and opportunities for police training'.[82]

An early study in Rialto, California, in 2011, found that BWV reduced use-of-force incidents by a remarkable 59 percent, and reduced citizens' complaints by an even more remarkable 87.5 percent.[83] A European expert flagged that Rialto had a high-intervention model of policing and results might not be easily generalizable. Subsequent trials and research in the United States and elsewhere have been less conclusive. In 2015, George Mason University analysed the results of 44 studies of BWV and found a range of results, including studies with contradictory outcomes and studies showing no impact at all on police behaviour.[84] They did not identify a single study examining the use of BWV to assess the frequency of stops or the ethnicity of the persons stopped. The focus of studies indicates an expectation that BWV will assist with resolving complaints and lawsuits, citizen cooperation, and critical incident review among other topics, but not bias or citizens' perception of it.[85]

Strengths:

- ⊕ Provides a contemporaneous account of contact
- ⊕ Assists in resolving complaints
- ⊕ May enhance civility in encounters
- ⊕ May support training

Weaknesses:

- ⊖ Does not record quantitative stop data
- ⊖ No record for person stopped
- ⊖ Risks of perspective bias
- ⊖ Cost, data storage requirements
- ⊖ Data editing for privacy required prior to release
- ⊖ Regulation is required to address BWV issues

Data collection process

Body-worn video is captured by small video and audio recording devices designed to attach to a police officer's uniform. Department policies differ greatly in terms of when officers should turn cameras on and what types of incidents they are developed to capture. Some cameras have a pre-record function that captures a defined amount of time before the camera is turned on. At the end of the shift, officers upload the footage filmed on shift onto the force system and can mark individual incidents for their evidentiary value.

Officer experience

Attitudes about the use of body-worn cameras varied quite sharply among the interviewees included in this study. One of the U.S. experts described himself as 'overall an advocate', noting that the results in Rialto are 'pretty stunning': 'If we came up with another initiative that reduced complaints by 90 per cent they'd say we have to do this', he noted. Some of those involved in the day-to-day oversight of stop and search in England and Wales described the use of BWCs as the 'long-term solution' or as 'the answer worldwide' for stop recording, suggesting that other developments around recording would become 'redundant'. The primary benefit of BWC, according to a supporter, is that they provide a contemporaneous record that is 'much better than human memory or a written record' and can potentially be used to adjudicate between competing versions of what happened:

> *"[Cameras] have utility. There are some things that hopefully will be beyond dispute if they're caught on video. There was one case where a female officer said an elderly man had swung a golf club at her and she'd arrested him for assault. The court subpoenaed the dash cam footage and it shows that at no point was he swinging a golf club and she was suspended. It definitively established that the officer had lied."*
>
> **Academic**, United States

But one of the British-based experts described BWCs as 'a form of micro-management' that signals supervisors do not trust officers and as a 'stick' that can be used to gain evidence to prosecute or discipline them. The use of cameras is a much more familiar feature of policing in the United States than in Europe; they are routinely installed into squad cars in the U.S.[86] This has provided a reference point in discussions about body-worn cameras in the United States:

"When we put cameras in cars there was resistance. Officers were saying, 'it's like having a sergeant in the backseat', but after six months they wouldn't go out without them because they realised they're good for them. I think we'll get to similar point with body-worn-cameras."

Academic, United States

Data entry and accuracy

In contrast to the discussion of other data capture methods in this report, which focus explicitly on generating quantitative data on police stop and search or identity check practices, BWV is not structured to generate quantitative data on the use of routine powers, such as stops or identity checks. The nature of BWV footage is inherently different from the data gathered though other recording practices discussed in this report. These limitations mean that BWV should not replace other forms of stop recording.

BWCs generate hundreds of hours of video footage. At the time of publication of this report, there was no way to search and sort the data along specific variables, such as the individuals' information (including race or ethnicity), the grounds for or results of a stop, without watching footage, coding it, and entering it into another database. This may change, as the IT sector develops improved video analytics to automate video review and analysis, incorporating new functions from facial recognition to biometrics, transforming the use of data for intelligence-led policing,[87] although the analytics currently being explored would not appear to address concerns with stop and search.[88] As one officer explains:

"The stop form takes you two minutes to fill out, [and] watching a video will probably take 30-40 minutes to go through to identify when on the footage the stops [occur]. And at no point have you got the officer's grounds. Has the video captured what the person was saying? Is the camera 100 percent working? If there is a slight fault in it and the microphone is not operating, I cannot hear the name, the reasons, the grounds. BWV is supporting evidence. It supports; it does not replace stop recording. It has no idea what's going on in your mind.... The camera is there to record actions in the same way a paper form would but a paper form is more accurate and the camera definitely can't replace forms because, when can a camera smell cannabis?"

Police Officer, United Kingdom

While police respondents were generally enthusiastic, civil rights activists and academics examining bodycams raise concerns about a range of issues around privacy of witnesses and victims of crime who are filmed, and the possibility of bias in footage filmed from the officer's perspective leading to 'context collapse'. Referencing a high-profile police killing of an unarmed black man in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 that spurred national protest an interviewee said:

> ***"After Ferguson the first question people were asking me is, where's the video? People were expecting it and the move towards these systems has taken on much more immediacy. Police chiefs are saying they want cameras and there's been overwhelming interest. This is good but I'm fearful that it will be done in a way that won't maximise the benefits. We need rules governing recording in homes for example. When is recording required? If the cameras are just going to be turned on when the police think it will useful, it won't solve the accountability issue. It may help the police, but unless we have a rule that says all street encounters are recorded, we won't get most of the benefits. We need to establish what the consequences are of not recording. We need to do all these things, otherwise it's going to be a bit scattershot."***
>
> **Academic**, United States

Supervisory value

As with other aspects of BWV footage, the value to managers and supervisors remains to be tested and assessed. A number of possibilities have been floated, including allowing officers to submit positive encounters for consideration in their performance reviews, but at this time, video footage remains primarily useful for checking the quality of individual encounters, particularly in the event of complaints or use of force.

BWCs were also said to provide a valuable training resource. One of the U.K.-based experts who had significant concerns about the use of cameras did note, however, that video footage could be used to promote reflection and self-assessment, noting that 'officers are often surprised when they watch themselves at what they've done and how their conduct comes over'.[89]

Geo-coding and mapping

BWV devices that include a GPS-locked clock can provide spatial and temporal coding of the data. This can enable searches for video based on the time and place of incidents.

Public experience

The rapidity of adoption of body-worn cameras was spurred by concerns about accountability and the expectation that a contemporaneous view of events would enhance external oversight. Among the 44 studies of the technology that George Mason University reviewed, 21 explore the quality of officer-citizen interactions including the nature of the interaction and communication, displays of procedural justice or professionalism, misconduct or corruption. An additional 17 studies examine the impact of BWV on the use of force. Early results are varied, as noted above, while other studies remain under way, but the evidence for improvements in accountability thus far are inconclusive or far more modest than hoped for.

If body worn cameras are to provide an accountability tool for accessing the lawfulness and the conduct of police encounters, it is essential that the person filmed be allowed access to the footage. At this time, the individual filmed has to make a request for the footage; there is no on-the-spot accountability from BWV, although immediate sharing would be possible with currently available technology. In the United States, anti-disclosure bills restricting public access to BWV footage have passed in half a dozen states, generally sponsored by legislators with law enforcement backgrounds.[90] U.K. police forces have interpreted the law differently, with some giving both individuals and scrutiny groups access to BWV footage while others will only allow the individual in the footage to access it.

In addition to their potential benefits, body-worn cameras have significant limitations. Even those who advocate their use were keen to stress that they should not be seen as a panacea. Interviewees highlighted the subjectivity involved in interpreting video evidence as evident in the Eric Garner case. Mr. Garner died after a NYPD police officers placed him in an apparent chokehold in what the Medical Examiner's Office ruled to be a homicide. Although the grand jury watched mobile phone video taken by at least three bystanders, they refused to indict the officer involved. While BWV footage was not part of the case, scholars have called the utility of the technology to check police violence into question because of it.[91] An interviewee stated:

> ***"Initially I felt body-worn cameras were good thing... but I have since watched the Eric Garner videos a few times and listened to the different interpretations put forward. The footage still has to be interpreted and this was personal recording so you can see the behaviour of the officers and Mr. Garner but it was still interpreted in such a way that the grand jury didn't indict the officer. It's amazing how divergent interpretations of the same footage can be."***
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> **Academic**, United States

As increasing amounts of video are filmed and made public, new concerns about privacy have come to the fore in discussions of BWV. Civil rights and police think tanks have grappled with privacy concerns alongside a host of wider issues: Should filming be continuous or should cameras be switched on and off? If so, when? What exceptions are permissible? Should filming be permitted when officers enter a private residence? Do subjects need to be informed that they are being recorded? How can the footage be protected against manipulation? How is the data to be stored and how long should it be retained? What are the rules governing disclosure?

While recommended standards have begun to emerge,[92] interviewees noted that use of body worn video is advancing faster than the legal and logistical infrastructure required to ensure appropriate and effective use:

> ***"Body-worn video is a flash bit of kit that you use, but it's the infrastructure behind the body-worn video that makes it worthwhile.... You need to have the infrastructure that allows you to capture, store, move, view, [and] delete the files on the basis of an ethical process. So we're buying at the moment a digital repository that will allow us to do, to use digital evidence, including body-worn video and documentation and other images, in a way that we can manage it ethically. Because what we had before was body-worn video being used on stand-alone systems in police stations, which meant you couldn't transfer the files. No one could audit them. You could put whatever you want on there. You could leave it on there. [If] you'd got [a] no deletion policy, you're non-data protection compliant. At the moment, we're putting the infrastructure in."***
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> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

Cost

BWV cost varies widely but can represent a significant investment for police departments. In the United States, a leading BWV company offered 'free' cameras to police agencies for a period, requiring payment for data storage only, but those costs can be considerable. Interviewees noted both cameras and storage systems have significant start-up and upgrade costs.[93]

SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH RECORDING METHOD

	Provides a full record	Capture individual suspicions	Allow for ethnic data collection	Ease of data entry	Accuracy	Supervision	Geo-coding and mapping	Cost	Speed of recording
Paper forms 	●	●	●	◑	◑	◑	○	●	◑
Dispatch radios 	◑	●	●	◑	◑	●	●	◑	◑
Mobile devices 	◑	●	●	●	●	●	●	◑	●
Body worn video 	○	○	○	○	○	◑	◑	○	○

KEY: ● High performance ◑ Moderate performance ○ Poor performance or inconclusive evidence

5. POLICY AND PRACTICE

The challenges posed by recording police stops go well beyond the technicalities of how to make a record. These broader challenges are rooted in a combination of human and system factors. Foremost among the human challenges is the need to combat resistance to change. Resistance to recording stops within police agencies was a recurring theme across the interviews conducted for this study, and interviewees emphasised the importance of police leadership, messaging, and ownership as key factors in overcoming resistance. System factors relate to the infrastructure required to create, store, and use stop records for their intended purpose, and related questions about procurement, software development, the role of corporate interests, and cost considerations. This chapter focuses primarily on the human factors, with sections on resistance, leadership and messaging, engagement and ownership, and procurement issues.

RESISTANCE TO REFORM

Police occupational culture is typically conservative, pragmatic, and suspicious of solutions that are developed elsewhere—all of which can block innovation.[94] Most policing innovations originate from outside the police organisation, yet as Skogan notes, police are 'sceptical about programs invented by civilians' and 'are particularly hostile to programs that threaten to involve civilians in defining their work or evaluating their performance'.[95] As an interviewee stated:

> *"There's still plenty of resistance to: one, collecting data; two, collecting the right data; and three, making it public. Anything that U.S. police are ordered to do from outside is something they are less interested in doing and there will be more push back. The closer we can get it to being internally generated—police departments explaining why they're doing it—police are more likely or willing to do it. Court mandated changes generate a lot of resistance. Officers on the street probably don't like it because it limits autonomy and they don't like being told what to do even if it's their boss, but it it's coming from within the police organisation it's seen as being legitimate."*
>
> **Academic**, United States

Skogan's research documents that outside interventions can be counter-productive when they foster indifference or resistance within the police organisation and weaken internal monitoring systems.[96] Nonetheless, the U.S. Department of Justice has intervened in over 20 state and local law enforcement agencies through their powers to address 'pattern and practice' of civil rights violations. These interventions have been criticised for being overly legalistic and for focusing on substantive compliance rather than sustainable reform.[97]

Interviewees suggested it was 'intuitive' to resist change, particularly when it is 'being forced on people', and identified various reasons why police may be reluctant to record stops. As well as concerns about inefficiency and 'unnecessary' bureaucracy, they identified the recording of stops as a source of considerable anxiety among officers, who view it as a challenge to their autonomy, their sense of integrity and, ultimately, their authority. An officer in Spain, where BWV is not common, explained:

> ***"The first thing police believe is, if Spanish law does not require this and the national police don't have to do this, why must I? They think it must be two things—either my bosses want to know how much I work or it might be because I am a racist."***
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> **Police Officer**, Spain

The focus of stop data collection on addressing racial bias tends to deepen officer resistance, a factor many interviewees identified across all settings. The U.S. Department of Justice noted that while recording police stops has many benefits, officers may resist the implementation of the system because they feel insulted, particularly if they take it as an accusation that they stop people based on their race.[98]

> ***"Whenever you start to evaluate people, they will feel uneasy… The race issue was a significant factor in their reactions, but the two things go hand and hand. The race dimension is there: officers will go 'you're saying I'm racist', and it's the law enforcement culture: 'how dare you question me, we are the police, don't you trust me?' Whenever you try and change things there's pushback, but the race dimension was an aggravating factor."***
>
> **Police Officer**, United States

There were similar dynamics in England and Wales, despite the introduction of statutory legislation requiring recording. Fifteen years after the 1984 PACE Act, the inquiry into the police investigation into the racist murder of 18-year-old Stephen Lawrence found a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism, and a failure of leadership by senior officers.[99] The inquiry noted 'inescapable evidence' of a lack of trust between the police and minority ethnic communities expressed in universal complaint about stop and search as one of four areas where institutional racism was primarily apparent.[100]

As part of its broad-based recommendations to create trust, the Lawrence Inquiry recommended that existing regulations on stop and search be strengthened by requiring that all police stops be recorded.[101] PACE was subsequently revised to abolish 'voluntary' stop-searches and to require officers to record stops in which they only ask the stopped person to account for him or herself (actions, behaviour, presence, or possession of anything). The reform agenda met with considerable resistance; many officers were

angered by the 'accusation' of 'institutional racism', which was widely considered as an affront to their integrity and professionalism.[102] That anger extended to the new recording requirement, which they saw as an externally imposed reform.[103] Police departments effectively rebranded the recording of all police stops as an additional source of intelligence rather than a way of improving monitoring and accountability.[104]

Government-led attempts to reinvigorate the regulation of stop and search have prompted the widespread adoption of technological methods of data collection across England and Wales, reflecting a calculation that the perceived efficiencies of technical and less bureaucratic approaches would lessen officer resistance. The transition to technological approaches has, nonetheless, not been entirely straightforward, with concerns raised about workload and timely data entry. An interviewee said:

> ***"There were two areas of resistance. One was the control room, because we're in a time where we've got lots of fiscal challenges for the public sector... so decanting a new function into them which they don't already have is a challenge.... The other one was the officers.... I think some officers were concerned that this was making a very simple thing more difficult to do for them. And in a way it was, because in common with lots of forces, there were quite a lot of shortcuts that officers took to record searches, and quite often they'd make a few scant details at the time in a notebook or something, and then they'd add to those details later on after the interaction."***
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

However, these resistances did not prove decisive and were said to have dissipated as officers and staff became familiar with the new approach: 'now that officers have done it [used a BWC] a few times and got used to it.... I think they're relaxing into it and going, 'do you know this is fine, this is actually quite easy for us'.

Research conducted in the United States notes a similar pattern in which initial resistance to the use of cameras in police cars gave way to widespread acceptance. According to Harris, the use of 'dash cams' has become quite popular with police and their departments as the benefits have become apparent: cameras have been found to enhance officer safety, improve agency accountability, and reduce agency liability.[105] As well as preserving evidence, officers report that recording increases their professionalism in dealing with citizens and suspects. Interviewees anticipated that similar dynamics would come into play with body-worn cameras.

LEADERSHIP

A key factor in overcoming resistance is leadership. This was especially prominent in police agencies that were recording stops where there was no external requirement to do so. A case in which recording was introduced in one small Spanish police agency at the behest of a then-sergeant, after he attended a presentation on racial profiling, illustrates this point:

> ***"We felt we had to learn from our mistakes to go forward. We said yes because we are brave, we think nowadays police always have to rethink their methodologies in all aspects; we have to innovate and develop."***
>
> **Police Officer**, Spain

The sergeant did not anticipate that skin colour would be the basis of profiling among his agency: 'A black person in [the city where he worked] is not a danger in the minds of people in the same way as they are in the U.S. The stereotypes are different'. Rather, the concern focused on stereotypes about dress and ethnicity with Arab people and Roma people thought to be particularly vulnerable.

The sergeant adapted forms used in England and Wales to Spanish legal requirements and began by piloting the forms with a small number of trusted colleagues. Although he noted there was 'a lot of resistance to the forms', recording has been successfully embedded into the life of the department: the form is covered in induction and training, officers 'feel the form is part of the work' and supervisors 'tell their officers they have to do the form'. This was partly achieved through performance management procedures: during the implementation phase, forms were systematically checked against other records, including fines and crime reports, and officers who had not submitted a form received a letter. Three such letters in a single year became part of officers' disciplinary records.

Similarly, an interviewee noted that resistant leadership can make reform difficult:

> ***"Often times this kind of activity is undertaken because of the threat of litigation or because something happens in the community. This creates a different dynamic, especially if the leadership feels it's something they shouldn't do. If the leadership pushes it and feels you should be doing it—you get resistance from officer but you can mitigate it. If the leadership is dragged to the table it's a completely different dynamic."***
>
> **Police Officer**, United States

Changes of leadership may also present a significant threat to innovation and reform as new leaders often bring their own priorities and may have little interest in completing or maintaining projects implemented by their predecessors.[106] The experience of introducing traffic stop recording in one U.S. city illustrates the point. Both the leadership of the police chief and the voluntary nature of the initiative were identified as key factors in overcoming resistance. A subsequent change in leadership lost much of the momentum behind recording; data collection continued but was subject to little analysis and the original emphasis on promoting internal and external accountability dissipated. Another leadership change then reinvigorated the effort with greater sense of personal investment revitalizing established procedures.

Similarly, in 2013, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services noted non-compliance with PACE and 'noticeable slippage' in the level of attention given to stop and search by senior officers since the 1999 Lawrence Inquiry report.[107] Subsequent reforms, including the requirement to map stop and search, have again demanded the attention of senior officers, and some respondents suggested that prior defensive reactions were beginning to dissipate:

> ***"I think the thing is, we've now admitted, and I always use the [analogy] of, if you can't admit you're an alcoholic you can't ever face it, and now at least the job has admitted we had a problem with stop and search, and our senior management at least has admitted it was a mess, and it is filtering down. It was a humungous mess, and yes we are partially responsible."***
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

Officers responsible for overseeing the implementation of the reforms noted that police leaders set the tone for the organisation and helped ensure that officers and staff lived up to expectations:

> ***"Well I think when you've got an ACC [Assistant Chief Constable] and indeed the Chief Constable, the PCC [Police and Crime Commissioner] saying 'we need to get this sorted', kind of everybody drops into line, because we are, at the end of the day, we're a hierarchical, disciplined organisation. The message comes from the top and we get on with it."***
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

COMPLIANCE, MESSAGING, AND TRAINING

In addition to leadership, police agencies use a variety of approaches, often in combination, to advance compliance and buy-in with the collection of stop data. These range from strengthened auditing and oversight, sometimes through inclusion in existing procedures, to more inclusive efforts to engage officers in the process to design and roll-out new systems.

The use of technology can support compliance. Several police departments in England and Wales used the push towards technological data capture as an opportunity to tighten supervisory procedures and generate improved management information. Where stops were recorded via the control room this was said to have the advantage of 'closing off' various 'short-cuts' because it meant officers had to complete the record at the time of the encounter. In Spain, most of the agencies involved in piloting the recording of stops established some quality control techniques to ensure completion, collection, and entry of records, including comparing completed stop forms with records of radio calls made in connection with police stops.[108] In one of the sites the control would routinely ask officers for the number of the stop form when an identity check was being conducted, thereby encouraging officers to complete the form when they called in the stop.

Disciplinary proceedings can also be used to enforce compliance, as long as stops and forms are reviewed and officers held to account for failure to complete a form or to show that they have met legal grounds for the stop. However, the use of disciplinary procedures to motivate police staff may increase resistance to reform without wider efforts to support officer understanding and acceptance of data collection. Policing reform processes have highlighted the limitations of hierarchical, top-down structures and autocratic leadership styles[109] in failing to enforce compliance and have raised questions about the quality of interaction and communication between supervisors and officers, and its impact on officers' conduct. One U.S. officer reflected on this in his department: 'We were very matter of fact that officers had to do it. We worked through the command structure. I'd do it a little differently now, I would do it more in partnership with staff, understanding what their issues and fears are'.[110] This insight has led some to consider the potential of procedural justice as a means of promoting change and encouraging compliance within police organisations.

A study of an English police department, which focused on a community policing initiative, found that an organisational justice approach enhanced officers' identification with the police organisation, increased positive views of community policing, and was associated with greater self-reported compliance.[111] The authors concluded that 'police organisations might do well to give their officers and staff a voice in organisational change programmes and ensure that managers and supervisors are seen to make fair decisions and to communicate those decisions openly and honestly'.[112] A study focusing on the use of force in Argentina found that officers' perceptions of fair treatment by and trust in supervisors were positively associated with (self-reported) compliance with regulations: 'Our findings suggest that a police force needs to ensure internal procedural justice in order to be able to also function in a procedurally just way on the outside'.[113]

Attempts to develop more cooperative approaches have led to a greater focus on messaging, implementation processes, and training. For example, referencing discrimination and racism can alienate officers. While the Lawrence Inquiry's finding of 'institutional racism' inflamed police opinion in England and Wales, police generally endorsed the general principles underlying the recording of police stops. Many officers supported the aim of increasing accountability, while those responsible for overseeing stop-search could see the benefits of recording in providing people with a credible reason for a stop and promoting fairness and efficiency.[114] It follows that initiatives framed as promoting accountability more broadly are likely to gain greater cooperation from officers than those specifically linked to discrimination and racism.[115]

Similar concerns were evident in Fuenlabrada, where supervisors presented the recording of stops to officers as a way of improving police/community relations by ensuring stops were justified:

"The message to officers was that the main target of introducing the form was not to identify the roughest officer but to improve relationships between police and citizens. The first message I gave out was that it doesn't matter to me how many people you ID check. Perhaps you have to check 100 or sometimes you don't do any. All that matters is you have a reason. If you have a reason—'well done'. There are two red lines we must not cross to ensure the form works. We do not control your work through the form and we do not look for racist police behaviour through this form. We do this through other means."

Police Officer, Spain

While other police agencies involved in piloting the recording of stops in Spain placed greater emphasis on diversity and discrimination, Fuenlabrada's distinctive approach was identified as a possible reason for its success. An independent evaluation found that the emphasis on improving the effectiveness of police stops and relations with the public seemed to mitigate the potential for negative reactions from officers.[116]

In addition to the messaging, agencies have adopted strategies to ensure that officers can participate and have some voice in the development and implementation of new policies. Fuenlabrada police piloted the use of the stop form and made adjustments based on feedback from those involved before rolling out the policy across the department: this process was said to have helped identify potential barriers to successful implementation, including officers' sensitivities about the implication that they might be racist.

An English police department created a practitioners' group consisting of constables and sergeants to develop the new stop-search form, which was much shorter and more tightly focused on the regulatory requirement than the one it replaced. The West Midlands and Warwickshire-West Mercia police implemented their new approach in phases,

enabling the project team to carefully manage the process and build support. In the initial implementation phase, questionnaires were distributed to officers and radio operators in West Midlands to gain feedback on the new arrangement and adjustments were made to simplify the process.

> ***"When we implemented it, [the project-lead] and the guy who did a lot of work on the actual system, they went out to each of the stations, so we rolled it out one by one if you like, went out and worked in the control room alongside the radio operator and said 'this is how easy it is, look at it', and they went 'blimey, that's it'.... It was a staged rollout. What we didn't want was the system to fail, by going live across the force on day one. So it was staggered rollout... and obviously the word spread very quickly around the usability of the system, how easy it was and there were no massive issues about rolling it out in the contact centres."***
>
> **Police Officer,** England and Wales

This inclusive approach was considered to have been crucial in supporting successful implementation: 'we've had absolutely nothing negative, there's been a lot of positive data out of the local police units—hugely positive'.

Police leaders advancing reforms emphasise that training alone will not change behaviour, but that training is an important secondary reform tool. Police agencies have developed training designed to promote recording and overcome resistance among officers. Early initiatives in the United States were accompanied by training that explained the purpose of recording to officers, focusing on the importance of professionalism and, in some cases, providing reassurances that data would not be used to discipline individual officers.[117]

Training for all front-line officers supported the introduction of stop forms in Fuenlabrada, covering how people feel when they are stopped, how police stops relate to human rights, and why this is important to policing. Representatives from non-governmental organisations, such as Amnesty International and minority associations, were involved in delivering the training.

West Midlands Police developed a bespoke training programme to support the introduction of its new approach. This programme was said to have 'transformed the way people saw stop and search and used it operationally'. A training video was developed that demonstrated how the new system worked and was supported by a 'really calm, controlled message' from the assistant chief constable, who said, 'it's not your right to do stop and search. I want you to use it, but I want you to use it proportionately, effectively'. Further, face-to-face training was delivered locally as part of the phased implementation process. The training was developed in consultation with practitioners

from West Midlands and other forces as well as local community representatives. The content included a 'massive focus on being civil' because 'a lot of complaints' concerned rude conduct by officers and attention was drawn to the various national and local bodies involved in scrutinising police conduct. Local officers—'peers', sergeants, police constables and inspectors—and community members selected as credible messengers delivered the training. An officer who attended the training said:

> *"[It is] really emotional to effectively be told [by your peers] 'you're doing it wrong, mate. You might think you're a good street cop, but actually you aren't doing it right. To some extent, you're breaking the law'. And then I think really the icing on the cake was, where we could, we brought in people from local communities.... We had a black guy who'd grown up in [name of local area], you know, openly said that until he was about 23 he didn't trust the police. And he said this is what it feels like in my neighbourhood when you do stop and search. This is what it means to us."*
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

PROCUREMENT AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

The movement towards IT platforms for an all data and records management is an inexorable trend in modern policing, and the use of technology appears to enhance police buy-in to stop data collection systems more than paper or radio dispatch systems do. While some data collection may continue to use paper forms or radio dispatch-based systems, it seems reasonable to expect that apps and other IT systems will dominate, raising some challenges around the procurement and development of IT infrastructure.

If mobile devices are going to be used to create the records, officers require hardware (unless they already have it), software, and data storage. Police departments are either purchasing ready-made products 'off-the-shelf' or contracting services from external vendors. In either case, police agencies are having to adapt and act like 'customers'. As an officer noted:

> *"In the past, police have probably been too quick to buy off the shelf products without really knowing what we need. We're trying to replicate what you have in smart technology at home for policing and are becoming better informed as the customer. We understand what the business user requirements are, rather than trying to shoehorn our needs into existing products."*
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

Purchasing mobile devices was considered to have the disadvantage that they quickly become outdated. As one officer noted, 'the forces that invested in BlackBerry [devices], well, where's that left them now? You're left in the past, aren't you?' Interviewees suggested that police forces are increasingly contracting services or writing equipment upgrades into contracts to avoid this problem. But they noted that there is no real way to avoid paying for upgrades; these measures just write the costs into the arrangement. Some police departments have explored ne the possibility of encouraging officers to use their own personal devices (e.g. mobile phones) at work in return for part payment of the bill. Although in the United States, at least some forces have determined this is unacceptable because an officer's entire mobile phone, including personal data, could become 'discoverable' during an investigation into misconduct.

Contracting external suppliers to provide and maintain bespoke databases has also caused problems. Complaints focused on the difficulties of making adjustments to the database because of the cost and time delays. One of the English forces involved in the early piloting of technological data-capture needed to make changes to deal with errors at the data-entry stage and to ensure compliance with Home Office requirements. A supervisor recalled that in response the external provider 'quoted us a lot of money for what was semantics' and 'we can't justify spending public money in that way'. As a result, the department considered going back to paper-based methods, and ultimately developed a bureaucratic remedy for the problem they might have addressed technologically. Another police department involved in the initial piloting reported a similar experience when it wanted to amend its database to allow sergeants to authorise the record before it was finalised:

> *"[A technology company was] involved in the design of [our system] and they ain't cheap at anything. So I went to the technical person [at the company] and said… 'Right, we've got to get a solution to this. What we need is a system where the sergeant can access this and type in comments on the information that's provided'. And about nine months later I got a response saying, 'yeah we had a look at this', and they'd got this massive report, huge report, and they quoted us like £50,000. I said: 'Well we don't want a new system…. We just want to know if the sergeant can go on it'. It was laughable…. So we couldn't do it… The cost prohibited it. It was £50,000 to put in a tick box."*
>
> **Police Officer**, England and Wales

Partly in response to such difficulties, other police departments had developed their own databases internally:

"Well I mean, in terms of developing this, we have deliberately not involved any external organisation… because of cost and licencing and updates. [We use] a system we've developed inside the force using our own assets, and I have to say, given the experience we've had previously with… some companies… it's been a blessing…. I think my own personal experience is, if you involve an external company, you're beholden to them to a certain extent. You have to pay annual update, licencing fees, update fees, if you want to change anything there's a cost to it. It isn't going to happen there and then. So in some ways it's restricted. Now, that doesn't mean you can't work with that, but we made the conscious decision to go alone on this, and that has been one of the strengths. Because it's within our ability to deliver, we didn't need anybody."

Police Officer, England and Wales

One police department in the United Kingdom entered into a five-year partnership with a large management consultancy in order to improve its information and communication systems, noting that they were 'a partner rather than outsource'. This is an easier option for a large police department. Other, smaller, departments were coming together to jointly procure services hoping to share the design-cost and strengthen their negotiating position.

MANAGERIAL AND OVERSIGHT VALUE OF STOP DATA

Recording does not, in and of itself, constitute a solution to the potential difficulties associated with police stops. According to a senior officer with strategic responsibility for stop-search across one of the English police departments:

"I think we wrongly believed that introducing a new recording system would solve all the lack of knowledge and training…. [But] you end up using the new system as poorly as you used the previous one."

Police Officer, England and Wales

Recording stops is best thought of as the beginning, rather than the end of a process, and much depends on what is then done with the resulting data. Records are often used to promote supervisory and corporate accountability, and can have value for operational decision-making. The extent to which records may be used as of intelligence is a matter of debate (see chapter 2), but they can be used as a source of management information, enabling managers and supervisors to assess how efficiently resources are being deployed. Where the location of a stop is recorded, it is possible to map police activity and compare it with distribution of reported crime, supporting assessments of whether stops and searches are being conducted in the right areas and at the right time or appear to be the appropriate response to the nature of the reported crimes.

CASE STUDY: NORTHAMPTONSHIRE POLICE REASONABLE GROUNDS PANEL

In 2014, the Northamptonshire Police (UK) introduced a "Reasonable Grounds Panel" (RGP) to monitor and improve its use of stop and search. The panel represents an innovative approach to providing accountability and operationalising the requirements that all stops meet 'reasonable suspicion' and that communities are actively engaged in the process of review laid out in the national guidance. Most notably, perhaps, the panel process involves community members in the assessment of individual stop and search encounters and includes a clear set of organisational responses where use of the powers is deemed unsatisfactory.

A selection of stop-search grounds that may fall short of the requirement for reasonable suspicion are put before a panel of police officers and members of the public who deliberate and decide whether or not each meets the requirement for reasonable suspicion. For each case, the grounds are presented in anonymised form so members do not know the personal details or characteristics of the searching officer or the person searched. The panel decides whether or not the grounds are 'reasonable' based on a vote. Unfavourable decisions lead to action based on an escalating scale of development: (1) an email outlining the causes of concern to the officer and his or her supervisor, (2) a one-to-one coaching session with the officer, (3) suspension of stop-search activity until the officer can complete a personal development plan and (4) referral to the Professional Standards Department.

The panel has established a mechanism for assessing the use and supervision of the powers and encouraging a more circumspect use of the stop-search across the police department. It meets the requirement for public scrutiny and feeds into a process of professional development for officers who fall short of the expected standard. As well as providing greater oversight of stop-search, the panel involves a range of community members in an active process of decision-making, operationalising the principle of 'policing by consent.' By engaging police and public in a common enterprise, the panel engendered mutual trust and confidence. Community participants describe valuing the sense of involvement, while police participants said they came away feeling 'supported' and 'appreciated.' The cooperative nature of the contact challenged public conceptions of the police and police conceptions of the public, creating a greater sense of proximity and reciprocity.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has highlighted the Reasonable Ground Panel as an example of good practice.*

*Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services [HMICFRS] (2017a) PEEL: Police legitimacy (including leadership) 2017 - An inspection of Northamptonshire Police, London: HMICFRS. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-legitimacy-2017-northamptonshire.pdf [Accessed February 10, 2018].

Open Society Justice Initiative (2018), *Regulating Police Stop and Search: An Evaluation of the Reasonable Grounds Panel*, New York: Open Society Foundations. Available at: http://osf.to/RGP

While stop data is often viewed as a managerial tool, the key rationale for and function of stop data collection is to support efforts to address the frequency and nature of contact with members of the public. In order for stop data to serve this purpose it must be shared with the public, and structures must be created for engagement and discussions, including a public role in holding police to account for their use of stop-search powers.

> ***"We wanted to do more than collect and analyse data. If the information indicates people are being targeted, what do you do? We introduced training to help staff stop doing it. We developed a community engagement strategy, but there was no road map. Collecting the data was a jumping off point. We aimed to promote a more accurate conversation with the community."***
>
> **Police Officer,** United States

In the United States, one department developed a workshop format to find solutions to the challenge of racial profiling by promoting what a police officer called 'an open and honest dialogue between law enforcement and the communities they are sworn to serve and protect'. In Spain, a local police force accompanied internal monitoring and statistical analysis of stop records with ongoing dialogue with citizens' associations, minority associations, and non-governmental organisations. In England and Wales, PACE requires that stop-search records facilitate accountability (see chapter 1), although Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that practices for community engagement varied greatly between police departments. In 2013, half the police departments were doing nothing, and many outreach efforts were characterised as typically corporate in their approach: circulating department-level statistical information through the media or department web sites, public meetings, and scrutiny groups with community groups with little structure for feedback or deeper engagement and accountability.[118] Accountability of individual officers is typically treated as an internal matter and little room is left for community members to call individual officers to account over specific incidents. However, there are several police departments that have developed innovative scrutiny panels that allow members of the public to use stop data to consider broadly how stops are being used across the department area and assess individual records to review the quality of specific stops.

6. CONCLUSION

The recording of police stops is an important mechanism that can promote accountability. Police agencies wishing to document their use of ID checks, stops, and searches in order to monitor and improve the fairness and effectiveness with which they use these powers may use any of the three methods discussed here: pen and paper forms, radio dispatch systems, or mobile devices. Body-worn video however, will not address this aim, as it does not generate the disaggregated quantitative data needed to analyse stop practices.

Although often viewed as 'old-fashioned', paper and pen methods of recording represent a simple and relatively effective way of collecting stop data. The clear benefit of paper-based systems is the ease with which the officer can provide a full copy of the record to the person stopped at the time. This offers reassurance that the person is not being unfairly targeted and conveys a message that their rights are being respected. As well as supporting on-the-spot accountability, paper-based recording has the added advantage of being affordable. Unless the necessary equipment is already available, technological approaches involve significant set-up costs. Where police agencies are unable to make such an investment, paper-based methods provide a viable alternative.

Radio dispatch-based systems have the advantage of exploiting existing technology and practice, while fitting more naturally into the process of conducting a stop. Officers typically call dispatch and control rooms prior or during a stop, so data collection systems can be integrated into existing behaviour. While there are still start-up costs to integrating new features, and increased demands made of control room staff, those involved in implementing this approach felt it was workable, efficient, and replicable. Radio systems encourage officers to make a record at the time and to fully articulate the grounds in front of the person stopped; they also give police agencies the option of recording exchanges between officers and back office staff, providing immediate supervision.

Police agencies increasingly use mobile phone apps and IT systems to collect stop data and represent a streamlined, real-time method of data capture. Police officers view them positively and they allow for automatic geo-coding and direct data entry improving accuracy. These approaches were said to promote tighter supervision and management. However, creating an infrastructure to support the recording of stops presents a number of challenges around system design, cost, software development, and the role of commercial interests.

Both radio dispatch and mobile technological data collection approaches are less well-suited to providing on-the-spot accountability to members of the public. Technological approaches do not produce a physical record that officers can easily present to the subject of a stop. Alternative arrangements can be made to enable those stopped to get a complete record of the stop-search after the event, but they typically increase the costs of accessing the information and potentially compromise privacy (where people need to give personal details to access the record). Making a full copy of the record available electronically and/or by providing a receipt that includes a written summary of the grounds for the stop may offset these weaknesses.

In a practice related to, but not an effective substitute for, stop recording, the use of body-worn cameras to record encounters between the police and the public is an emerging and increasingly common practice. Video footage may help to resolve disagreements over what happened in specific incidents, but the scope of its value for accountability remains under assessment. Body-worn cameras are not well suited to generating statistical information about police stops or to providing the person stopped with a record of the encounter, which is why other forms of recording are necessary to capture this data.

As this research shows, each of the methods of recording have different strengths and weaknesses. The choice of recording system will reflect both the priorities and dynamics of the given context, and the reasons driving the adoption of stop recording. If a police agency is upgrading its IT infrastructure, there may be clear value to including stop recording in that process and embedding it in the agency's core business processes. If recording is primarily focused on public accountability to the persons stopped, pen-and-paper has the important advantage that it provides a full record at the time of the stop, despite seeming old-fashioned to many officers. Whichever system a department implements, it must be carefully be analysed not only for its feasibility and to make sure that the system's weak points (and every system has them) are understood and explicitly compensated for in the process of design and implementation. The design process should reflect considerations around accountability ('on-the-spot,' supervisory, or corporate), bureaucracy, and compliance from the beginning.

Recording police stops should not be seen as a narrow technical exercise. Effective recording depends on a broader set of human and system factors, including leadership, active management, and officer compliance. Regardless of how stops are recorded, some level of resistance should be anticipated. While the support of police leaders is essential to generate organisational ownership, hierarchical and top-down methods of implementation are unlikely to ensure active compliance across the board. There is emerging evidence that procedural justice—the belief that fair procedures support fairer and more widely accepted outcomes—provides a useful means of promoting change and encouraging compliance within police organisations. Regarding the recording of stops, this means that management must think carefully about associated messaging, as well as including practitioners in development and design processes, negotiating with those responsible for implementing new policies and practices, ensuring that the implementation process is manageable and sustainable, and clearly communicating the rationale for the changes to front-line officers.

Research has shown that the public, particularly those from ethnic minority communities, value stop recording as a means of enhancing accountability and creating possibilities for making complaints. Implementation of recording systems must equally reflect communities in the development and design processes. It is essential that systems are based around a solid understanding of local community concerns so that the system designed can begin to respond directly to those concerns. For example, in jurisdictions where there are concerns about ethnic profiling, stop data collection systems that do not collect ethnic data will not respond to those concerns and are likely to exacerbated mistrust. The collection of personal data, particularly ethnic data, is complex and must

be negotiated with local communities to respect the right to self-identification and build public confidence in the data collection process.

Simply making a record of police stops does little to address the potential problems with such encounters and much depends on what departments do with the resulting information. Giving a copy of the record to the person stopped at the time of the encounter provides on-the-spot accountability and offers a practical way of achieving some of what procedural justice demands. Stop recording can structure consistency and promote a discussion about use of stops to ensure impartiality and neutrality. Providing information about how to complain can support those stopped to feel they have a voice in the process. Records also support internal monitoring and supervision. Records can ensure that police leadership have a greater understanding of how their officers are using stop-searches to manage both individual officers' use of their powers and departments' strategic management of their resources and focus. External accountability is often framed in corporate terms, prompting policies in which agencies simply distribute general statistical information with little meaningful exchange about what that data means and little incorporation of community feedback into police practices. Ideally, stop data should be used as the basis for a discussion of local policing practices and priorities.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: RESOURCES ON DATA COLLECTION

- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Preventing Unlawful Profiling now and in the future: a guide, Luxembourg, Publications Office, December 2018, http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/prevent-unlawful-profiling

- Hopkins, T. (2017) *Monitoring Racial Profiling: Introducing a scheme to prevent unlawful stops and searches by Victoria Police*, Victoria: Flemington and Kensington Community Legal Centre. Available at: http://www.policeaccountability.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/monitoringRP_report_softcopy_FINAL_22082017.pdf

- Open Society Justice Initiative (2015) *Fair and Effective Police Stops: Lessons in Reform from Five Spanish Police Agencies*, New York: Open Society Foundations. Available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/fair-effective-police-stops-20160208.pdf

- Open Society Justice Initiative (2013) Reducing Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: A Handbook of Good Practices. Available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/reducing-ethnic-profiling-european-union-handbook-good-practices

- Open Society Justice Initiative (2009) Addressing Ethnic Profiling by Police—A Report on the Strategies for Effective Stop and Search (STEPSS) Project, New York: Open Society Foundations. Available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/addressing-ethnic-profiling-police

- Ramirez, D., McDevitt, J., and Farrell, A. (2000) A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned, Washington: U.S. Department of Justice.

APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE STOP FORMS

STOP FORM—Fuenlabrada Municipal Police, Spain



Policía de Fuenlabrada

Identificación de personas en vía/lugar públicos

0002

Fecha:		Hora de inicio de la parada:	
Lugar de la parada:			
Apellidos:			
Nombre:			
D.O.I.:	Tipo:	Núm.:	
Nacionalidad:		Fecha nacimiento:	
Población de nacimiento:			
Provincia:		País:	
Hijo de:		y de:	
Domicilio:			
Nº:		Piso:	Localidad:
Provincia:		Teléfono:	
Motivo de la identificación:			
Observaciones sobre la motivación:			
Se procede a registro personal:	Sí ☐ No ☐	Es positivo el registro:	Sí ☐ No ☐
Objetos intervenidos:			
Otros datos de interés:			
Vehículo relacionado:		Matrícula:	Color:
Se formula denuncia:	Sí ☐ No ☐	Normativa denuncia:	
Infracción:			
Ilícito penal	Sí ☐ No ☐	Actuación	Falta penal ☐ Imputado no detenido ☐ Detención ☐
Tipo penal:			
Hora del final de la parada:		Agentes actuantes N.I.P.	

Ayuntamiento de FUENLABRADA
Concejalía de Seguridad Ciudadana y Tráfico
Servicio de Policía Local

AGIS 2006

With financial support from the AGIS Programme
European Commission - Directorate General Justice. Freedom And Security

F-0149

STOP FORM—Northamptonshire Police, United Kingdom

RECORD OF STOP AND SEARCH OF PERSON / VEHICLE

- All searches MUST comply with PACE Code A.
- Searches MUST be based on reasonable suspicion except those permitted by authority
- **REASONABLE SUSPICION** supposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person may have committed an offence.

GO WISELY

- **G**rounds
- **O**bjective(s)
- **W**arrant Card
- **I**dentification
- **S**tation
- **E**ntitlement to receipt or copy of form (3 months)
- **L**egal powers
- **Y**ou - "you are detained for the purposes of a search"

Form 915 Rev 06/17 345700

STOP SEARCH GUIDANCE

Where on reasonable grounds it is considered necessary to conduct a **More Thorough Search** this must be done out of public view (a police vehicle is suitable unless below paragraph applies).

Any search involving the removal of more than an **outer coat, jacket, gloves, headgear or footwear**, or any other item concealing identity*, may only be made by an officer of the same gender as the person searched and may not be made in the presence of anyone of the opposite sex unless the person being searched specifically requests it. * does not apply to section 60 aa powers.

Searches involving exposure of intimate parts of the body must not be conducted as a routine extension of a less thorough search, simply because nothing is found in the initial search. These searches must be conducted out of public view but not in a police vehicle. All searches must be conducted in accordance with PACE.

If a **"More Thorough Search"** is conducted the supplementary form (in the rear of the stop search pad) must be completed and attached to the original search form before submission.

There is no requirement to provide the subject with a copy of the supplementary form but consider if there is a reason not to if asked - the form could be photocopied to facilitate this.

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE POLICE

Last name _____

First Name(s)_____ Gender _____

DOB D D M M Y Y Y Y SDE IC

GOWISELY explained Y N VRM

Search grounds _____

Items sought _____

Items found Y N Relate to power used Y N N/A

Items found _____

Location of stop _____

Location of search _____

Search code Outcome code If arrested, reason for arrest:

Arrest linked to power used Y N

Time H H M M Date D D M M Y Y

Officer ID Station _____

Police copy

Address _____

Property Ref N/A

Use of Force Ref N/A

Arrest Ref N/A

BWV Y N Ref _____

IF SDE NS -

Any other info (include make, model and colour of vehicle searched) _____

More Thorough Search Y N

If yes, complete supplementary form and attach before submission

Supervisor I am / am not satisfied this form has been fully completed and that grounds as recorded on this form comply with the relevant legislation and codes of practice.

S'visor ID Signature _____

Actions taken if not satisfied _____

_____ Date D D M M Y Y

STOP FORM—Northamptonshire Police, United Kingdom (contiued)

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE POLICE

Last name _____

First Name(s)_____ Gender _____

DOB D D M M Y Y Y Y SDE IC

GOWISELY explained Y N VRM

Search grounds _____

Items sought _____

Items found Y N Relate to power used Y N N/A

Items found _____

Location of stop _____

Location of search _____

Search code Outcome code If arrested, reason for arrest:

Arrest linked to power used Y N

Time H H M M Date D D M M Y Y

Officer ID Station _____

Public copy

You should always be treated fairly and with respect, if you feel this has not happened you are entitled to complain. You can do this in writing to: The Chief Constable at: Police Headquarters, Wootton Hall, Northampton, NN4 0JQ. Alternatively you can fill out our confidential and anonymous stop search survey on the Northamptonshire Police website **www.northants.police.uk**

SEARCH CODE

A Aviation Security Act 1982 (section 27(1))
B Conservation of Seals Act 1970 (section 4)
C Criminal Justice Act 1988 (section 1398)
D Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994 (section 60)
E Crossbows Act 1987 (section 4)
F Customer & Excise Management Act 1979 (section 163)
G Deer Act 1991 (section 12)
H Environmental Protection Act 1990 (section 348)
I Firearms Act 1968 (section 47)
J Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (section 23)
K Poaching Prevention Act 1862 (section 2)
L Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (section 1)
M Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (section 6)
N Police Reform Act 2002 (section 4, paragraph 7a)
O Protection of Badgers Act 1992 (section 11)
P Public Stores Act 1875 (section 6)
Q Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (s36(2))
R Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (s37(2))
S Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (s38(2))
T Sporting Events Act 1985 (section 7)
U Terrorism Act 2000 (section 43)
V Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (section 19)

Outcome codes	
1	No further action
2	Reported - Summons/TFBR
3	Arrested
4	PND
5	Caution
6	Cannabis/khat warning
7	Local Resolution
8	Other (please detail)

SEARCH CODE

A Aviation Security Act 1982 (section 27(1))
B Conservation of Seals Act 1970 (section 4)
C Criminal Justice Act 1988 (section 1398)
D Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994 (section 60)
E Crossbows Act 1987 (section 4)
F Customer & Excise Management Act 1979 (section 163)
G Deer Act 1991 (section 12)
H Environmental Protection Act 1990 (section 348)
I Firearms Act 1968 (section 47)
J Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (section 23)
K Poaching Prevention Act 1862 (section 2)
L Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (section 1)
M Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (section 6)
N Police Reform Act 2002 (section 4, paragraph 7a)
O Protection of Badgers Act 1992 (section 11)
P Public Stores Act 1875 (section 6)
Q Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (s36(2))
R Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (s37(2))
S Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 (s38(2))
T Sporting Events Act 1985 (section 7)
U Terrorism Act 2000 (section 43)
V Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (section 19)
W Other (please detail)

Outcome codes	
1	No further action
2	Reported - Summons/TFBR
3	Arrested
4	PND
5	Caution
6	Cannabis/khat warning
7	Local Resolution
8	Other (please detail)

All grounds recorded must comply with the "Officer Guidance" published in Force Orders and on the Force website.

There is a positive presumption a search form will be issued at the time of the search and not just offered. A reason for non-issue must be recorded on the "Any other info" section of the form. "Form issued" must be noted where this has been done.

GOWISELY must be explained before a search is undertaken.

STOP FORM—Northamptonshire Police, United Kingdom (contiued)

Arrest codes	
A	Theft offences
B	Drugs
C	Firearms
D	Offensive Weapons
E	Bladed articles
F	Going equipped
G	Public Order
H	Terrorism S43(1)
J	Fraud
K	Damage/items to cause damage
L	Non crime
M	Other - please detail

SDE - NS	
1	Did not understand
2	Refused to answer
3	Emergency
4	Public order
5	Other

	SELF DEFINED ETHNICITY	GROUP	CODE	SELF DEFINED ETHINICITY (16+1)
1	English/Welsh/Scottish/ Northern Irish/British	White	W	White British
2	Irish			White Irish
3	Gypsy or Irish Traveller			White Other
4	Any Other White Background			White Other
5	White and Black Caribbean	Mixed/ Multi Ethnic Groups	M	Mixed Caribbean
6	White and Black African			Mixed African
7	White and Asian			Mixed Asian
8	Any other Mixed / Multiple Ethnic background			Other Mixed
9	Indian	Asian/ Asian British	A	Indian
10	PakistanI			Pakistani
11	Bangladeshi			Bangladeshi
12	Chinese			Chinese
13	Any Other Asian background			Other Asian
14	African	Black African / Caribbean / Black British	B	Black African
15	Caribbean			Black Caribbean
16	Any Other Black / African /Caribbean background			Other Black
17	Arab	Other Ethnic Group	O	Any other ethnic group
18	Any Other Ethnic Group			Any other ethnic group
19	Not stated	Not stated	NS	Not stated

More Thorough Search Form

1 Name of Subject _____

2 Was it conducted in private place? Y☐ N☐

3 Where was it conducted? _____

4 Who was present?

Name	Collar	Gender

5 What clothing was removed? _____

_____

6 What parts of body were exposed? _____

7 If subject is a Juvenile was an Appropriate Adult present? Y☐ N☐

If yes, who? _____

Relationship with subject _____

8 Is subject a Vulnerable person? Y☐ N☐

Detail why _____

9 Was this search authorised by a Supervisor? Y☐ N☐

If yes - who? _____

10 Was property found as a result of the more thorough search element of the search?
if yes, please detail on the initial search form Y☐ N☐

When complete attach to initial search form and submit as usual

10 pages of this at back of book

Any Other Information

STOP AND SEARCH APP—West Midlands Police, United Kingdom



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